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tion exercisable by a court, this article examines jurisdiction in corporate insolvency within 
Australia. It begins with the constitutional context and then addresses geographical jurisdiction, 
jurisdiction to prescribe conduct, and jurisdiction to adjudicate between parties. It briefly touches 
upon the notion of an inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate in liquidation and on jurisdiction for 
proceedings during the course of, rather than on the adjudication of, a liquidation. The discussion of 
jurisdiction to adjudicate in a multi-state liquidation in Australia addresses the winding-up of a 
foreign company under Part 5.7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), as well as topics such as forum 
non conveniens, lis alibi pendens, anti-suit injunctions, and the notion of discretion to exercise 
jurisdiction to wind up a company. The jurisdiction to provide aid and auxiliary assistance upon 
request from a foreign court is also touched upon briefly.] 
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The Court’s inherent jurisdiction, while broad, is not unlimited.1 
I   INTRODUCTION 
Fundamental to the winding-up of a company that is insolvent is that otherwise 
justified claims will remain unsatisfied. The phenomenon of the failed HIH 
Insurance Group brought home to many people who may previously have had 
little interest in insolvency that ‘just’ claims may well go unrewarded. For 
example, parties with actions in negligence against otherwise impecunious 
policy holders were suddenly faced with the reality that their ‘someone should 
pay’ expectation would be unmet, because there was no-one who ‘could pay’. 
The combination of impecunious defendants and their insolvent insurers meant 
that claims would remain unrequited. 
Yet the law, particularly in areas principally derived from statute, may contain 
lacunae that prevent applicants from receiving what they believe to be the ‘just 
desserts’ of a judgment in their favour. Drafters of legislation, in seeking to reify 
the wishes of the government and to ‘flesh out’ the bones of its policy, may 
choose words that do not cover the particular permutation or combination of 
facts that serendipitously evolved. Such a fate awaited Mr Lunn, apparently the 
sole traceable member of the Cardiff Coal Co (‘Cardiff’). Mr Lunn unsuccess-
fully sought the moribund, albeit solvent, private trading corporation’s winding-
up as a Part 5.7 body under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations 
Act’).2 
While the case of Lunn [No 2]3 involved local proceedings in a corporate 
insolvency, it was not a multi-state insolvency, in the sense of dealing with facts 
arising in more than one state or law area.4 Yet, as discussed below, the lack of 
this multi-state dimension was fatal to Mr Lunn’s application.5 Gaps in the law 
may also arise where an insolvency crosses jurisdictional borders because the 
local legislators have not considered or have chosen not to address the ‘foreign’ 
implications of a multi-state insolvency. 
The majority of companies in Australia derive their existence from the Corpo-
rations Act and as such, the provisions on external administrations to achieve 
 
 1 Lunn v Cardiff Coal Co [No 2] (2003) 173 FLR 63, 71 (Barrett J) (‘Lunn [No 2]’). 
 2 A winding-up order was finally made in Lunn v Cardiff Coal Co [No 3] (2003) 177 FLR 411: 
see below n 139 and accompanying text. 
 3 (2003) 173 FLR 63. 
 4 The term ‘multi-state’ is used to signify an insolvency that crosses borders between legal 
systems. Unless otherwise indicated, the term ‘state’ refers to a law area where one system of 
private law prevails: Edward I Sykes and Michael C Pryles, Australian Private International 
Law (3rd ed, 1991) 5. Thus, within the Australian federal system, it might refer to a state (or 
territory) where that is the relevant law area, or it may refer to the Commonwealth of Australia 
where the law area is federal. The term ‘international’ is not used because there may be in-
tra-national insolvency issues in a federation. For a recent intra-national liquidation case, see 
Maamari v Ringwood & Ply Pty Ltd (2005) 187 FLR 477, where the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales made an order terminating a winding-up where a winding-up order had been made 
by the Supreme Court of Queensland. Having regard to Corporations Act s 58AA(2) and the 
definition of ‘Court’ in s 58AA(1), Barrett J held it was clear that the jurisdiction conferred by 
s 459A to make an order terminating a winding-up is exercisable by any one of the courts re-
ferred to in the definition: at 478. 
 5 See below Part III(D)(1). 
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their dissolution are also largely to be found in this statute. In the case of a 
multi-state insolvency, however, the statutory provisions are to be applied in the 
context of the (largely judge-made) principles of private international law. A 
range of laws may be relevant to determining issues in a corporate insolvency 
administration, as insolvency provisions may intersect not only with those 
regulating companies but also with laws on property, securities, and civil and 
criminal liability. Underpinning all of these are procedural laws which are often 
critical to the eventual outcome. 
This article addresses local proceedings in a multi-state corporate insolvency, 
focusing specifically on liquidation. Following a brief description of multi-state 
insolvency theories, Part III classifies the different types of jurisdiction that a 
court may exercise. It then concentrates on jurisdiction in corporate insolvency 
within Australia, beginning with the constitutional framework and then address-
ing geographical jurisdiction, jurisdiction to prescribe conduct, and jurisdiction 
to adjudicate between parties. The last briefly touches on the notion of an 
inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate in liquidation and on jurisdiction for proceed-
ings during the course of, rather than for the adjudication of, a liquidation. 
Parts IV and V provide a more detailed discussion on jurisdiction to adjudicate in 
a multi-state liquidation in Australia and address the winding-up of a foreign 
company under Part 5.7, as well as topics such as forum non conveniens, lis alibi 
pendens, anti-suit injunctions, and the notion of discretion to exercise jurisdic-
tion to wind up a company. Finally, brief comments are made on the jurisdiction 
to provide aid and auxiliary assistance upon request from a foreign court. 
I I   MULTI-STATE INSOLVENCY THEORIES   
Analysis of multi-state insolvency (specifically bankruptcies or liquidations 
with multi-state dimensions) has traditionally been undertaken using the two 
theoretical extremes of ‘universality’ and ‘territoriality’. These terms are often 
used interchangeably with the terms ‘unity’ and ‘plurality’; however the distinct 
(though connected) issues require separation.6 ‘Unity’ and ‘plurality’ relate to 
jurisdiction and the number of courts which have jurisdiction to open insolvency 
proceedings over a debtor. ‘Universality’ and ‘territoriality’ relate to the 
multi-state effects7 of the insolvency proceedings.8 
Under the principle of ‘unity’, there is one set of insolvency proceedings in 
respect of the one debtor, while ‘plurality’ means that there are multiple sets of 
proceedings in progress concurrently in different states. ‘Universality’ refers to 
 
 6 Ian M Fletcher, ‘Future Developments: Problems with International Insolvencies, Section 426 
Co-operation Proceedings, Developments and MIICA’ (1991) 6 Journal of International Bank-
ing Law 89, 92. 
 7 The term ‘multi-state effects’ is used to describe, in general terms, both the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign orders. The specific term ‘recognition’ is used to refer to the conclusive 
or res judicata effect of a judgment. ‘Enforcement’ refers to the execution of a judgment — the 
defendant’s compliance with its terms. See T C Hartley, ‘The Recognition of Foreign Judgments 
in England under the Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention’ in K Lipstein (ed), Harmonisation 
of Private International Law by the EEC (1978) 103, 105. 
 8 Nicki Kayser, ‘A Study of the European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings’ (1998) 7 
International Insolvency Review 95, 100. 
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the extraterritorial effect of one set of proceedings in every other jurisdiction, 
while ‘territoriality’ refers to the limitation of the effects of a set of proceedings 
to its place of origin.9 
‘Territorialism’ addresses choice of forum by permitting a court to exercise 
jurisdiction over any debtor that satisfies local insolvency law requirements. 
Choice of law ‘follows the forum’, in that the law of the forum applies to all 
aspects of the insolvency. The strictly territorialist approach claims no extraterri-
torial reach to a local insolvency order. Thus, each state which accords itself 
jurisdiction over a debtor has authority to administer the debtor’s estate within its 
jurisdiction. However, there are few states that adhere to the strict territorialist 
approach. 
‘Universalism’ involves two aspects. First, the ‘active’ aspect means that an 
insolvency proceeding, opened in the insolvent debtor’s domicile, place of 
incorporation or seat, claims to comprise all the assets of the debtor, including 
those located in other states. Second, the ‘passive’ aspect means that, if an 
insolvency proceeding is opened abroad in the insolvent debtor’s domicile, place 
of incorporation or seat, it will be given full local effect in each state that has 
adopted the universalist approach.10 
Choice of forum under the universalist approach is based on the debtor’s 
country of domicile or, in the case of a company, its place of incorporation or 
seat. The doctrine accepts the universal extraterritorial effect of an insolvency 
adjudication made in such a forum. The law of the forum then governs the 
insolvency administration, including its foreign effects.11 As with territorialism, 
choice of forum is therefore likely to be outcome-determinative because of the 
differences in states’ insolvency laws.12 
Scholars have proposed various models that modify these theoretical extremes, 
some of which can be found in current state or convention practice. The qualifi-
cations often involve concurrent proceedings, which recognise home state 13 
insolvency administrations to a greater or lesser degree. In a multi-state insol-
vency, judicial orders are typically required in more than one state in order to 
control the debtor’s assets. These concurrent proceedings may take the form of 
ordinary civil litigation,14 enforcement of foreign judgments obtained during the 
 
 9 Ian F Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (3rd ed, 2002) 684–5. Another author refers to ‘one set of 
proceedings (unity) effective in every jurisdiction (universality)’: Donna McKenzie, ‘The EC 
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings’ (1996) 4 European Review of Private Law 181, 182. 
 10 Ulrich Drobnig, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency: General Problems’ (1993) 19 Forum Internationale 
9, 13. See also Louis Jacques Blom-Cooper, Bankruptcy in Private International Law (1954) 14: 
‘A single adjudication depends for its efficacy upon acceptance of that adjudication by foreign 
countries, in order to allow the appointed trustee … to collect all the assets, thereby bringing 
about an equal distribution amongst all the creditors.’ 
 11 This choice of law of the forum is an implicit assumption of universalism: Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, ‘Global Insolvencies in a World of Nation States’ in Alison Clarke (ed), Current 
Issues in Insolvency Law (1991) 27. 
 12 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and 
Choice of Forum’ (1991) 65 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 457, 471. 
 13 ‘Home state’ is traditionally the state that comprises a corporate debtor’s place of incorporation 
or ‘seat’. This article presumes it to be the state that is a corporate debtor’s place of incorpora-
tion, unless its place of management control is established as being elsewhere. 
 14 This is often between the administrator of the debtor’s estate and various creditors or third 
parties holding property allegedly part of the debtor’s estate. 
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principal administration, specific aid and assistance for a foreign principal 
administration, or separate insolvency administrations. 
Concurrent insolvency administrations often comprise liquidation adjudica-
tions that purport to be the ‘main’ administration15 and similar adjudications in 
other jurisdictions with lesser claims to significance in the debtor’s affairs. These 
‘non-main’ administrations typically take one of two forms. First, such proceed-
ings may primarily be intended to aid the main administration and therefore will 
not amount to a sequestration of the debtor’s assets. For example, they involve a 
local moratorium on creditor action and assistance to the foreign administrator in 
realising local assets. Second, local liquidation administrations may be instituted, 
albeit ones which recognise the main administration and cooperate to a greater or 
lesser extent with it. 
Various terms are used for these forms of non-main administrations. In Ameri-
can terminology, the former are known as ‘ancillary proceedings’ and the latter 
are ‘parallel proceedings’.16 English and Australian case law,17 on the other hand 
tend instead to use the term ‘ancillary’ for local non-domiciliary (non-main) 
bankruptcy or liquidation administrations. Insolvency-related proceedings 
brought to assist a foreign administration, not being a local bankruptcy or 
liquidation, do not have an established nomenclature. 
‘Modified universalism’ accepts the central premise of universalism — that 
there should be a single administration which collects and distributes assets on a 
worldwide basis. However, modified universalism alters this by reserving to the 
local forum the discretion ‘to evaluate the fairness of the [foreign home state] 
procedures and to protect the interests of the local creditors.’18 In the exercise of 
its discretion, the local forum is to consider whether ‘deferring to’ the single 
foreign home state administration would alter parties’ entitlements or offend the 
forum’s public policy. 19  It is undertaken when a foreign administration is 
 
 15 There may be more than one administration which is claimed by each office-holder to be the 
debtor’s home state proceeding. 
 16 See the ‘Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communication in Cross-Border Cases’, 
adopted by and promulgated in American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency: Principles of 
Cooperation among the NAFTA Countries (2003) 115 (appendix B). 
 17 See the English and Australian cases cited in Re Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA 
[No 10] [1997] Ch 213. 
 18 In Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies’ (1991) 17 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 499, 517, Westbrook cites Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC 
§§ 304–6 (1991) as the leading example of this approach. Section 304 provided for a local pro-
ceeding which aids the court in the foreign main administration. However, local assistance was 
not automatic and depended on the US court’s assessment of what would best assure an eco-
nomical and expeditious administration of the estate. Their assessment was to be guided by six 
factors ranging from comity through to the protection of US creditors against prejudice and 
inconvenience in the processing of their claims in the foreign proceedings: Bankruptcy Code, 11 
USC § 304(c) (1991). See Mary Elaine Knecht, ‘The “Drapery of Illusion” of Section 304 — 
What Lurks Beneath: Territoriality in the Judicial Application of Section 304 of the Bankruptcy 
Code’ (1992) 13 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 287; Charles 
D Booth, ‘Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the Inconsistent 
Approaches of United States Courts’ (1992) 66 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 135; Doug-
lass G Boshkoff, ‘Some Gloomy Thoughts concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies’ (1994) 72 
Washington University Law Quarterly 931. 
 19 Lynn M LoPucki, ‘The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ (2000) 
98 Michigan Law Review 2216, 2221. 
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claimed as the home state administration such that local proceedings should be 
stayed and all property and claims should be dealt with by the foreign of-
fice-holder. Local proceedings are therefore merely auxiliary proceedings. 
Where the discretion is exercised against assisting the foreign home state 
administration, then a local insolvency administration may be instituted. Local 
insolvency law will therefore apply.20 
‘Cooperative territorialism’ is a system in which each state administers the 
assets over which it has jurisdiction21 as a separate estate, distributing them 
under local insolvency law. None of the proceedings are principal, ancillary or 
auxiliary; rather each constitutes a separate administration. 22  The system, 
however, acknowledges the multi-state dimension by providing for cooperation 
in the administration of the separate estates. 
‘Secondary bankruptcy’23 — or to use a broader term which would be applica-
ble to companies as well as individuals, ‘secondary insolvency’24 — is currently 
practised in various forms. Under municipal law, it is mandated in statute25 and 
judge-made law,26 and it also appears in various multilateral conventions and 
international solutions.27 Until recently, scholars have typically described the 
phenomenon, rather than proposed it as a theory placed within the frameworks of 
universalism and territorialism.28 In a secondary insolvency system, insolvency 
administrations proceed concurrently in each state in which a debtor has a 
substantial presence.29 In common with modified universalism, it recognises a 
home state main administration with which other states cooperate. However, it 
differs in that the local proceedings are ancillary liquidations 30  rather than 
 
 20 See the Australia–United States case of Interpool Ltd v Certain Freights of M/V Venture Star, 
102 BR 373, 878 (Politan J) (DNJ, 1988). 
 21 Lynn M LoPucki argues that such jurisdiction depends upon having de facto power over the 
assets, including the exercise of such power through multi-state agreement with respect to intan-
gibles. That is, it would only include property that the state had sovereign power to marshal 
without the assistance of other states: Lynn M LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bank-
ruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach’ (1999) 84 Cornell Law Review 696, 743. 
 22 Ibid 742. 
 23 Ibid 732. 
 24 Kent Anderson, ‘The Cross-Border Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the Modified Universal 
Approach considering the Japanese Experience’ (2000) 21 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law 679, 692. 
 25 Corporations Act s 601CL(14). 
 26 Re Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA [No 10] [1997] Ch 213. 
 27 See European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, opened for signature 
5 June 1990, ETS 136 (not yet in force); Council Regulations (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 
2000 on Insolvency Proceedings [2000] OJ L 160/1; United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law: Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 36 ILM 1386 (1997) (‘UNCITRAL 
Model Law’). 
 28 Hans Hanisch, ‘Survey over Some Laws on Cross-Border Effects of Foreign Insolvency 
Procedures on the European Continent’ in Ian F Fletcher (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency: Com-
parative Dimensions (1990) vol 12, 159; Westbrook, ‘Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insol-
vencies’, above n 18, 516. But see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational 
Default’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2276, 2276; Kent Anderson, above n 24. 
 29 LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy’, above n 21, 732. 
 30 For an example of an ancillary liquidation, see Re Wayland as liq of ABC Containerline NV (in 
liq) (2005) 52 ACSR 750. 
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auxiliary proceedings. 31  Local assets are realised and distributed to locally 
secured and priority claims.32 Any remaining assets are then remitted to the 
primary administration for distribution.33 
These theories from multi-state insolvency literature assist with providing the 
insolvency law context for issues which are also dealt with in private interna-
tional law scholarship on matters of jurisdiction. The following Part outlines the 
jurisdictional framework within which specific issues concerning company 
liquidation are subsequently addressed. 
I I I   CLASSIFICATION OF JURISDICTION  
The term ‘jurisdiction’ encompasses both geographical jurisdiction and subject 
matter jurisdiction.34 Geographical jurisdiction delimits the area with which a 
relevant connection (such as physical presence or the carrying on of business) 
with one or more of the parties is to be established. Geographical jurisdiction 
also defines the area within which the court’s judgments will prima facie be 
enforced or have direct or automatic effect.35 
Subject matter jurisdiction, a court’s authority to deal with disputes, itself 
comprises two elements: the jurisdiction to prescribe conduct and the jurisdiction 
to adjudicate between particular parties. Jurisdiction to prescribe — or ‘substan-
tive jurisdiction’ — is satisfied where a court ‘has jurisdiction over the conduct 
complained of, in light of the nature of the conduct’.36 Jurisdiction to adjudicate, 
or ‘personal jurisdiction’, is ‘the power a court has over a person because he or 
she is amenable to being served with the court’s initiating process in accordance 
with its rules.’37 It comprises several categories of proceedings, each with its 
own special rules that, if met, enable the court to adjudicate between the particu-
lar parties. In order to hear a matter, a court must have both jurisdiction to 
prescribe and adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
 
 31 For an example of an auxiliary proceeding, see Re Independent Insurance Co Ltd (2005) 193 
FLR 43. 
 32 Hans Hanisch, ‘“Universality” versus Secondary Bankruptcy: A European Debate’ (1993) 2 
International Insolvency Review 151, 157; Kent Anderson, above n 24, 693. 
 33 John Londot, ‘Handling Priority Rules Conflicts in International Bankruptcy: Assessing the 
International Bar Association’s Concordat’ (1996) 13 Bankruptcy Developments Journal 163, 
173. 
 34 Martin Davies, Sam Ricketson and Geoffrey Lindell, Conflict of Laws: Commentary and 
Materials (1997) 113. 
 35 Cookney v Anderson (1862) 31 Beav 452, 462; 54 ER 1214, 1217–18 (Romilly MR) defines 
geographical jurisdiction as ‘the topographical limits within which the compulsory process of 
the Court operates to compel obedience to its orders and decrees.’ Enforceability in a foreign 
jurisdiction requires the foreign court to recognise and enforce the judgment. 
 36 Michael Lennard, ‘Weaving Nets to Catch the Wind: Extraterritorial and Supra-Territorial 
Business Regulation in International Law’ (Paper presented at the 23rd International Trade Law 
Conference, Canberra, 29 May 1997) 1 (emphasis in original). Some courts, such as the Family 
Court and the Federal Court, have been vested with limited jurisdiction to prescribe, unlike the 
state and territory Supreme Courts: see Enid Campbell, ‘Inferior and Superior Courts and Courts 
of Record’ (1997) 6 Journal of Judicial Administration 249. 
 37 Reid Mortensen, Private International Law (2000) 37. 
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A  Constitutional Framework for Bankruptcy and Insolvency Jurisdiction  
The constitutional allocation of legislative powers between the Commonwealth 
and state Parliaments has affected the legislative history of, and courts with 
jurisdiction over, personal bankruptcy and corporate liquidation in Australia. The 
colonial constitutions granted legislative authority in general terms to colonial 
(now state) Parliaments to pass laws for the ‘peace, order and good government’ 
of particular geographical areas (subject to certain powers of the Imperial 
Parliament).38 Upon federation, legislative authority was redistributed between 
the Commonwealth and the states. ‘Bankruptcy and insolvency’39 was one of the 
specific powers granted to the Commonwealth to be exercised concurrently with 
the states.40 
The colonies’ personal bankruptcy and insolvency laws41 continued in exis-
tence until being made otiose by comprehensive Commonwealth bankruptcy 
legislation.42 Although the grant of power to the Commonwealth to legislate on 
‘insolvency’ was wide enough to extend to the liquidation of companies,43 the 
English approach of including the regulation of corporate insolvency in the 
general corporations’ legislation was followed in Australia. Thus, the colonies — 
and later, the states — continued to legislate on the winding-up of trading 
companies and other associations in various Companies Acts.44 
The Australian Constitution granted the Commonwealth limited concurrent 
power over corporations, specifically to make laws with respect to ‘foreign 
corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of 
the Commonwealth’. 45  Despite the constitutional limitations imposed by the 
words ‘trading’, ‘financial’ and ‘formed’, a move towards uniform corporate 
regulation in Australia began in 1961 through essentially standard state legisla-
tion.46 An attempt was made in 1989 to legislate federally for Australia-wide 
comprehensive companies’ regulation. However, this was struck down as 
unconstitutional by the High Court.47 
 
 38 See, eg, Constitution Act 1889 (WA) s 2; see also Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) s 5 (‘peace, 
welfare and good government’); Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) s 2 (‘peace, welfare and good 
government’).  
 39 Australian Constitution s 51(xvii). 
 40 Where federal and state laws conflict, federal laws prevail: Australian Constitution s 109. 
 41 The colonies had laws based on the Bankruptcy Act 1883, 46 & 47 Vict, c 52, except Queensland 
and Tasmania whose laws were based on the Bankruptcy Act 1869, 32 & 33 Vict, c 71. 
 42 Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth), repealed by Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). 
 43 Justice R S French, ‘Federal Jurisdiction — An Insolvency Practitioner’s Guide to the Labyrinth’ 
(2000) 8 Insolvency Law Journal 128, 129, citing Victoria v Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 
575, 612 (Dixon J). See also Victoria v Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575, 624 (McTiernan J), 
658 (Kitto J). 
 44 Andrew Keay, McPherson: The Law of Company Liquidation (4th ed, 1999) 20–3. 
 45 Australian Constitution s 51(xx). See also H A J Ford, R P Austin and I M Ramsay, Ford’s 
Principles of Corporations Law (12th ed, 2005) 42. 
 46 Uniform Companies Acts of 1961–62, followed by the Companies Acts of 1981, although strict 
uniformity was not achieved. For more detailed background material, see Bills Digest No 140 
2000–01: Corporations Bill 2001 (2001). 
 47 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482. 
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As a consequence of this lack of a Commonwealth power ‘to enact a compre-
hensive corporations law’, 48  the Commonwealth, states and the Northern 
Territory negotiated a national scheme of cooperative legislation. In 1990, the 
states and the Northern Territory introduced their own statutes applying federal 
legislation passed for the Australian Capital Territory to regulate companies, 
grant national regulatory powers to the Australian Securities Commission (now 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’)) and cross-vest 
jurisdiction between the federal, state and territory courts.49 
In 1999, the cross-vesting scheme50 was held by the High Court to be constitu-
tionally invalid insofar as it attempted to cross-vest state jurisdiction in the 
federal courts.51 Soon afterwards, another High Court decision52 raised concerns 
about the continued viability of the cooperative scheme insofar as it involved 
Commonwealth officers and authorities (for example, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions or ASIC) performing functions conferred under state law. Subse-
quently, based on this decision, a challenge was made to the capacity of ASIC to 
incorporate companies under state law.53 After a period of significant uncertainty 
that adversely affected national commerce and foreign investment, agreement 
was finally reached between the various governments to put national corpora-
tions’ regulation on a firmer constitutional foundation. Through state referral of 
powers to the Commonwealth,54 in addition to the Commonwealth’s pre-existing 
constitutional powers, comprehensive federal legislation was passed in the form 
of the Corporations Act and the Australian Securities and Investments Commis-
sion Act 2001 (Cth) (‘ASIC Act’).55 
 
 48 French, above n 43, 130. 
 49 Despite this interlocking ‘national’ scheme, the geographical jurisdiction of the state and 
territory courts was prima facie the relevant state or internal territory of Australia. 
 50 Corporations Act 1989 (Cth); Corporations Act (New South Wales) 1990 (NSW); Corporations 
Act (Northern Territory) 1990 (NT); Corporations Act (Queensland) 1990 (Qld); Corporations 
Act (South Australia) 1990 (SA); Corporations Act (Tasmania) 1990 (Tas); Corporations Act 
(Victoria) 1990 (Vic); Corporations Act (Western Australia) 1990 (WA). See also, by implica-
tion, the general cross-vesting scheme under the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 
(Cth) and state equivalents. 
 51 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. The vesting of the applicable state 
jurisdiction in the other state Supreme Courts remained valid. The conferral of jurisdiction on 
the Federal Court with respect to civil matters arising under the Corporations Law of the Austra-
lian Capital Territory and Northern Territory, based on Australian Constitution s 122, was valid. 
 52 R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535. 
 53 See Transcript of Proceedings, GPS First Mortgage Securities Pty Ltd v Lynch; Ex parte A-G 
(Cth) (High Court of Australia, Callinan J, 23 June 2000) where his Honour referred the matter 
for hearing before the full High Court on whether relevant provisions of the Corporations Law 
of Queensland, relating to the registration of companies, in combination with Australian Securi-
ties Commission Act 1989 (Cth) s 11(7), empowered ASIC to incorporate companies and 
whether there was any inconsistency between such state and Commonwealth legislative provi-
sions under Australian Constitution s 109. 
 54 Australian Constitution s 51(xxxvii). 
 55 The states agreed to refer powers to the Commonwealth to enact the Corporations Bill 2001 
(Cth) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Bill 2001 (Cth) in so far as 
they contained matters that are within the legislative competence of the states. They also referred 
power to make express amendments to the Corporations Act or the ASIC Act in relation to for-
mation, corporate regulation and the regulation of financial products and services. The refer-
ences last for five years but may be terminated earlier or may be extended by proclamation. The 
referral of powers has been extended since 2001. 
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B  Geographical Jurisdiction in Liquidation 
Corporate insolvency law is contained in federal legislation and, while the 
cooperative scheme with all states referring the relevant powers to the Com-
monwealth is in operation, one Commonwealth Act applies across a single 
national jurisdiction.56 The Act confers civil jurisdiction,57 as well as vesting and 
cross-vesting criminal jurisdiction,58 in the relevant federal, state and territory 
courts. The courts with primary jurisdictional competence under the Corpora-
tions Act are the Federal Court and the state and territory Supreme Courts.59 
State and territory lower courts may determine certain civil claims, such as debt 
recovery and monetary compensation matters, subject to their general jurisdic-
tional limits as to the amounts and value of property with which they may deal.60 
The geographical area of competence of federal courts depends on the terms of 
the statute conferring the jurisdiction.61 The Corporations Act applies to all of 
Australia’s states and internal territories. Certain chapters, including Chapter 5 
(external administrations), 62  apply according to their tenor in relation to all 
natural persons, bodies corporate, unincorporated bodies and acts and omissions 
‘outside this jurisdiction’, which includes places outside Australia. 63  Certain 
sections specify their territorial application. For example, of possible relevance 
during a multi-state liquidation, s 186 states that ss 180–4 (officer liability) do 
not apply to an act or omission by a director or other officer or employee of a 
foreign company unless there is one or more specified jurisdictional connec-
tion.64 
The territorial boundaries of the state and territory courts,65 when acting in 
corporations matters remain unaffected. However, there is precedent for the 
Supreme Court of South Australia to sit outside the geographical territory of 
 
 56 The purpose of Corporations Act pt 1.1A is to clarify that the Commonwealth does not intend to 
cover the field in relation to certain aspects of corporations legislation and therefore to ensure 
the validity of state and territory law. For example, if states impose additional obligations or 
liabilities on directors, the Corporations Act is not intended to exclude or limit concurrent opera-
tion unless there is a direct inconsistency between the Commonwealth legislation and the state or 
territory law: Corporations Act s 5E. Section 5G(8) means that ch 5 of the Act does not apply to 
the winding-up of a pt 5.7 body to the extent that the winding-up is carried out in accordance 
with a provision of a law of a state: Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Bill 2001 (Cth) 23. 
 57 Corporations Act pt 9.6A div 1. 
 58 Corporations Act pt 9.6A div 2. 
 59 Corporations Act s 1337B. These courts and their officers must severally act in aid of, and be 
auxiliary to, each other in civil matters under the corporations legislation: Corporations Act 
s 1337G. 
 60 Corporations Act s 1337E. 
 61 Australian Law Reform Commission, Legal Risk in International Transactions, Report No 80 
(1996) 145. 
 62 This includes insolvency administrations. 
 63 See Corporations Act ss 9, 102B(2). Section 3(3) states that the operation of the Act outside 
Australia is based, amongst other things, on the Commonwealth Parliament’s external affairs 
power under Australian Constitution s 51(xxix). 
 64 For example, the act or omission occurred in connection with the foreign company carrying on 
business within the jurisdiction. 
 65 The sovereign and legislative territorial limit for state Supreme Courts in geographic terms is 
described in Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 61, 144. 
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Australia in a corporate insolvency case. 66  It arose out of the liquidator’s 
overseas investigations into the collapse of Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd, 
subsequently renamed Southern Equities Corporations Ltd (‘SEC’). In Eng-
land v Smith,67 the English Court of Appeal granted the assistance requested by 
the Supreme Court of South Australia. It ordered an English resident to attend 
before a Master of the Supreme Court of South Australia sitting in England and 
to be examined in accordance with Australian law and procedure.68 
C  Jurisdiction to Prescribe Conduct in Liquidation  
Jurisdiction to prescribe conduct is satisfied where a court has substantive 
jurisdiction (that is, jurisdiction over the conduct complained of due to the nature 
of the particular conduct).69 In corporate insolvency matters, the jurisdiction to 
prescribe conduct is vested in the Federal Court and state and territory Supreme 
Courts. Following the referral of the states’ corporations powers to the Com-
monwealth, the Corporations Act enacted a single federal jurisdiction in such 
matters, including external administration of companies. As federal courts have 
‘exclusive jurisdiction’ in bankruptcy, 70  many of the issues which arise in 
personal insolvency matters71 are not of concern in corporate insolvency because 
jurisdiction may be exercised concurrently by the relevant federal, state and 
territory courts. 
Jurisdiction in liquidation involves a wide range of matters with which a court 
may be involved in a winding-up context. In Gould v Brown, Brennan CJ and 
Toohey J noted that the ordering and conduct of examinations of directors 
constituted the exercise of judicial power.72 Even though the functions of courts 
in the judicial management of the property of bankrupts may involve a large 
element of discretion, they have nevertheless been upheld as a proper exercise of 
their judicial powers.73 
 
 66 See Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 45(2): ‘The court may sit at any place (either within or 
outside the State).’ Provisions with regards to sitting at any place may be found in Supreme 
Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 56(3); Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) 
s 19; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 7; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 38. Cf Supreme Court 
Rules 1970 (NSW) r 1A.1(1), which states that sittings shall be held at such places ‘as are ap-
pointed for that year or from time to time by the Chief Justice.’ 
 67 [2001] Ch 419. 
 68 Ibid 425–6, 433–4 (Morritt LJ) pursuant to Corporations Law pt 5.9 div 1. 
 69 Lennard, above n 36, 1. 
 70 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 27(1). 
 71 See, eg, Sutherland v Brien (1999) 149 FLR 321; GEIA v Palm Island Aboriginal Council 
(2001) 1 Qd R 245; Scott v Bagshaw (2000) 99 FCR 573; Denby v Shum [2002] QSC 117 (Un-
reported, Muir J, 3 May 2002). 
 72 (1998) 193 CLR 346, 388, citing R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 367–8 (Dixon CJ and 
McTiernan J) that to wind up companies may involve many orders, comprising the exercise of 
both typical judicial and non-judicial powers, but all of which have long fallen on the courts of 
justice. 
 73 James Crawford and Brian Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law (4th ed, 2004) 31–2, which refers 
to bankruptcy, although by analogy this comment would also apply to a liquidation. 
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D  Jurisdiction to Adjudicate between Parties in a Liquidation 
Jurisdiction to adjudicate between parties is determined according to the cate-
gory of dispute to be resolved. Three categories have been identified: actions in 
personam, actions in rem and a category for proceedings that do not fall within 
either of the foregoing.74 
The most important category is the action in personam. This is brought against 
a person essentially to compel them to do a particular thing or to cease to do 
something. A judgment in such an action only binds the parties, and their privies, 
to the action.75 At common law, jurisdiction to adjudicate in a particular action in 
personam requires valid service of the originating process on the defendant or 
the defendant’s submission to the court’s jurisdiction.76 
Service within the court’s geographical jurisdiction is typically by actual 
physical service on the defendant. 77  This is an example of power theory 78 
underpinning adjudicatory jurisdiction:  
The root principle of the English law about jurisdiction is that the judges stand 
in the place of the Sovereign in whose name they administer justice, and that 
therefore whoever is served with the King’s writ and can be consequently com-
pelled to submit to the decree made, is a person over whom the Courts have ju-
risdiction.79  
In certain circumstances, the plaintiff may obtain leave to serve a defendant by 
local substituted service. This may occur where the applicant can establish that 
personal service is impracticable and other means of service, such as by post, or 
by leaving the relevant document with a third party, are likely to bring the 
document to the respondent’s attention.80 
Statutory extensions to this jurisdiction, dating back to the Common Law 
Procedure Act 1852, 15 & 16 Vict, c 76, provide for service out of the jurisdic-
tion ‘where, speaking generally, there is some link between the forum and the 
subject matter involved.’81 In Australia, the rules of the High Court, Federal 
Court, and the state and territory Supreme Courts permit service of process 
 
 74 Sykes and Pryles, above n 4, 20–1. 
 75 Ibid. Actions in personam consist of actions in tort and contract, as well as suits in equity for 
relief, such as specific performance, injunction, rescission, and rectification: Peter Nygh and 
Martin Davies, Conflict of Laws in Australia (7th ed, 2002) 45–6. 
 76 Nygh and Davies, above n 75, 45–6. 
 77 Ibid 46. 
 78 Arthur Taylor von Mehren, ‘Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and 
Evaluated’ (1983) 63 Boston University Law Review 279. 
 79 Laurie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR 310, 323 (Dixon CJ, Williams and Webb JJ), citing John 
Russell & Co Ltd v Cayzer, Irvine & Co Ltd [1916] 2 AC 298, 302 (Viscount Haldane). On 
adjudicatory jurisdiction, see von Mehren, above n 78, 285–6. 
 80 See eg, Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 7 r 9(1); Supreme Court Rules 1937 (ACT) O 10 r 2; 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 10.14; Supreme Court Rules (NT) r 6.09; Uniform 
Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 116; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 14.01; Supreme 
Court Rules 2000 (Tas) r 141; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) 
r 6.10; Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 72 r 4. 
 81 Re Sherlock (1991) 5 ACSR 229, 230 (Lockhart J). Typical examples include where the relevant 
contract was broken within the jurisdiction or the relevant tort was committed within the juris-
diction. 
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outside the jurisdiction.82 Leave prior to service may be required. Where it is not, 
the court considers the manner of service where the plaintiff seeks to obtain 
judgment by default.83 
The second category of dispute is that of the action in rem.84 This involves 
jurisdiction over a thing (res), typically in the context of admiralty, as well as 
property interests therein.85 Jurisdiction to adjudicate is based on the presence of 
the res within the court’s geographical jurisdiction.86 This jurisdiction permits 
the court to determine title, rights or claims to the res and its resulting judgment 
is binding against the whole world.87  
Although jurisdiction in bankruptcy has been described as being a form of in 
rem jurisdiction over the property comprising the divisible ‘estate’,88 others have 
placed it in a category of proceedings that neither fall within actions in personam 
nor actions in rem, but rather are the subject of special jurisdictional rules.89 The 
major subcategories are proceedings in individual bankruptcy and corporate 
liquidation,90 matrimonial proceedings, probate and administration actions, and 
proceedings in lunacy. 
These proceedings involve matters of status and, accordingly, they potentially 
affect a party’s relations with others.91 Therefore, for example, bankrupt status 
 
 82 See, eg, High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 9.07.1; Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 8; Supreme 
Court Rules 1937 (ACT) O 12; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 11.2; Supreme 
Court Rules (NT) O 7; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) pts 6, 7; Supreme Court Rules 
1987 (SA) rr 18.02–21.08; Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) rr 147–53; Supreme Court (General 
Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) O 7; Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 10. 
 83 Further, the defendant, even though outside the jurisdiction, may have submitted to the local 
jurisdiction through a jurisdiction clause in a contract: Richard Garnett, ‘The Enforcement of 
Jurisdiction Clauses in Australia’ (1998) 21 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1, 2. 
 84 See Re Hayward [1997] Ch 45 on jurisdiction in the context of the Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened for signature 27 
September 1968, 8 ILM 229 (entered into force 1 February 1973) (‘Brussels Convention’). A 
trustee applied for an order entitling him, as trustee, to what had been the debtor’s share in a 
villa in Spain and for a declaration that the debtor’s interest in the villa formed part of the bank-
rupt estate. The English court dismissed the application on the basis that the bankruptcy exemp-
tion under art 1(2) of the Convention was not relevant and so the Convention applied. It held 
that, although the trustee’s claim could not have existed but for the bankruptcy, its principal 
subject matter was not the bankruptcy. Instead, the claim was essentially to recover assets, which 
were said to belong to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate and therefore to be vested in the trustee in 
bankruptcy, from a third party. As the trustee’s claim had as its object a right in rem in immov-
able property in Spain, the Spanish court had exclusive jurisdiction under art 16 of the Conven-
tion. The Convention is scheduled to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (UK) c 27. 
 85 The Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) has a category which comprises actions in rem, actions 
in admiralty and actions in which the title or possession of property is in issue. 
 86 Another example of the power theory for adjudicatory jurisdiction is specific jurisdiction limited 
by the value of the property: von Mehren, above n 78, 285. 
 87 Sykes and Pryles, above n 4, 21. 
 88 That is, under the English tradition: Ralph Brubaker, ‘One Hundred Years of Federal Bankruptcy 
Law and Still Clinging to an In Rem Model of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction’ (1999) 15 Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal 261, 263. 
 89 Blom-Cooper, above n 10, 46–7; Sykes and Pryles, above n 4, 21. 
 90 These accord with the exclusions from the definition of ‘actions in personam’ in Foreign 
Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 3 of ‘proceedings in connection with … (c) bankruptcy or insol-
vency; or (d) the winding up of companies’. 
 91 A sequestration order ‘effects a change in the status of a debtor [and] it affects the rights of the 
general body of creditors.’: Re Kassab; Ex parte Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 55 
FCR 305, 309 (Black CJ, Sweeney and Sheppard JJ). 
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affects one’s capacity to manage a corporation or to incur credit;92 marital status 
may affect one’s capacity to (re)marry; and mental competence may affect one’s 
capacity to contract. Another common theme to several of these proceedings is 
their impact on the administration of a person’s property or estate.93 
As Louis Jacques Blom-Cooper stated: 
[Bankruptcy] is neither wholly in personam nor wholly in rem. It is therefore 
considered that bankruptcy jurisdiction cannot be based entirely upon theories 
relating to other branches of Private International Law with regard to jurisdic-
tion.94 
Special statutory jurisdictional rules apply to indicate whether a court will 
order the bankruptcy or liquidation of an insolvent debtor.95 These rules are 
subject to the court’s discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction over a 
foreign debtor. They are also subject to the court’s statutory discretion when 
exercising the jurisdiction to decline to make such an order.96 
The special rules on adjudicatory jurisdiction in liquidation are described 
below.97 Meanwhile, two preliminary issues are discussed: the possibility of an 
inherent jurisdiction in liquidation and jurisdiction in respect of matters during 
the course of a liquidation. 
1 Inherent Jurisdiction to Adjudicate in Liquidation 
Occasionally, judges have made reference to the possibility of courts having 
inherent jurisdiction to wind up a company. It is not surprising that there is no 
comment on an inherent jurisdiction to bankrupt an individual debtor’s estate98 
because of the significant impact of such an order on the debtor and on a range 
of other parties’ interests. There has been some discussion of inherent jurisdic-
tion in relation to corporate insolvency, perhaps because the origins of general 
company law are linked with the law of partnerships.  
Prior to the Joint Stock Companies Winding Up Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict, c 111, 
unless incorporated by specific statute or charter, companies were deed of 
settlement companies and were treated as enlarged partnerships.99 Partnership 
 
 92 ‘One of the main incidents of bankruptcy is the capacity to act (or inability to act)’: 
Blom-Cooper, above n 10, 10. 
 93 Property may sometimes be affected in an ancillary fashion, such as orders in respect of 
matrimonial property in the context of divorce or annulment proceedings. 
 94 Blom-Cooper, above n 10, 46. 
 95 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 43 (refers to specific connections); Corporations Act ss 459A, 
459B, 461, 583, 601CL(14) (relies on the definition of entity, that is, ‘company’, ‘Part 5.7 body’, 
‘registered foreign company’). That is subject to any judge-made requirement for any additional 
connection: Re Norfolk Island Shipping Line Pty Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 990; see below n 177 and 
accompanying text for further discussion. 
 96 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 43; Corporations Act ss 467, 581, 583. This statutory discretion 
does not apply to an ancillary liquidation of a registered foreign company that is being or has 
been wound up in its place of incorporation, as a court ‘shall’ order a liquidation in the circum-
stances set out in Corporations Act s 601CL(14). 
 97 See below Part IV. 
 98 As opposed to the inherent jurisdiction of a court to set aside a sequestration order: Pol-
lock v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 94 ATC 4148, 4152 (Carr J). 
 99 Insolvency Law Review Committee, United Kingdom, Report on Insolvency Law and Practice, 
Cmnd 8558 (1982) 24, describing joint stock companies prior to the 19th century reforms of 
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law therefore applied to their winding-up, which largely comprised the taking of 
accounts between partners and the adjustment of the rights of contributories.100 
Modern winding-up law recognises the interests of members (and officers) in the 
winding-up process — something which is not relevant to bankruptcy law for 
individual debtors. Modern partnership law 101  entitles every partner, on the 
dissolution of a partnership, to apply to the court to wind up the business and 
affairs of the firm. This legislative history may have influenced some courts’ 
willingness to look beyond the ‘procedural codes’ of statute in the case of 
winding up a company to administer justice between all interested parties. 
There are two comparable situations in which a Supreme Court may act to 
appoint an external administrator of an entity or property. The first derives from 
the Supreme Court Acts and the second from a Supreme Court’s inherent 
jurisdiction.  
The state and territory Supreme Courts have authority under the various Su-
preme Court Acts to appoint a receiver where the court considers it ‘just or 
convenient’ to do so.102 As the ‘court will not appoint a receiver otherwise than 
at the instance of a party who is before the court’,103 the court must already be 
exercising jurisdiction over a dispute between the plaintiff and the company. This 
discretionary power to appoint a receiver arises ‘where it is practicable and the 
interests of justice require it.’104 The main situations where it may be invoked 
are: 
1 where the plaintiff’s security is enforceable (and a private appointee would 
have limited powers); 
2 where the plaintiff’s security is in jeopardy;105 
 
company law as ‘really large unincorporated partnerships’. As to the use of management trusts, 
see Paul L Davies (ed), Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (6th ed, 1997) 29. 
100 Keay, above n 44, 11. 
101 Partnership Act 1891 (Qld) s 5(2) states that ‘partnership’ under the Act does not apply to ‘the 
relation between members of any company or association which is (a) [a registered company 
under corporations’ legislation]; or (b) formed or incorporated by or in pursuance of any other 
Act of Parliament or letters patent, or Royal Charter’. 
102 See, eg, Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 67: ‘The Court may, at any stage of proceedings, on 
terms, appoint a receiver by interlocutory order in any case in which it appears to the Court to be 
just or convenient so to do.’ See also Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 246: 
a receiver [may be] appointed by an interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it 
shall appear to the court to be just or convenient that such order should be made and any such 
order may be made either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court shall 
think just. 
See also Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 34A (‘just to do so’); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) 
s 29(1) (‘just or convenient’); Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 11(12) (‘just and 
convenient’); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 37 (‘just and convenient’); Supreme Court Act 
1935 (WA) s 25(9) (‘just or convenient’). Cf Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 57 
(‘just or convenient’). Note that in Victoria, the court may appoint a receiver by an interlocutory 
or final order: Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 37. 
103 Lawbook Co, Company Receivers and Administrators, vol 2 (at 47) [19.1260], citing 
McMeckan v Aitken (1895) 21 VLR 65, 69 (Holroyd J). 
104 Edwards & Co v Picard [1909] 2 KB 903, 907 (Fletcher Moulton LJ). 
105 This is to protect secured property in jeopardy even though the plaintiff’s charge is not yet 
enforceable. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.50.05 PM — page 160 of 46
  
160 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 30 
     
3 where the plaintiff is seeking to protect other property in the possession of 
the company;106 and 
4 where a receiver is sought by way of equitable execution to obtain payment 
of a judgment debt.107 
The Federal Court may also appoint a receiver by interlocutory order in any 
case in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient so to do.108 An 
instance where this occurred in the context of a respondent company’s question-
able solvency is the case of Mercator Property Consultants Pty Ltd v Christmas 
Island Resort Pty Ltd. 109  Circumstances considered relevant by the court 
included: evidence that the major asset of the company, its casino licence, was in 
danger of being revoked; the strong possibility that the company’s affairs were 
being conducted for the benefit of the major shareholders rather than the 
company as a whole; and the existence of debts, including unpaid wages, in 
excess of $2 million owed to creditors. 
Under succession law, a Supreme Court may exercise inherent jurisdiction to 
appoint receivers in the administration of deceased estates. Where there is local 
property, but the legal personal representative is outside the jurisdiction, a 
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, may appoint a 
receiver of the local assets in order to protect the property from deprivation and 
loss.110 A receiver may also be appointed over assets outside the jurisdiction if 
there is no foreign administrator.111 
Nevertheless, in a number of cases, courts have refused to achieve the same 
outcomes as a liquidation through court-appointed receivers or through schemes 
of arrangement.112 In Re Swallow Footwear Ltd,113 Roxburgh J reviewed the 
appointment of a receiver and manager upon the application of an unsecured 
creditor in respect of a non-judgment debt. His Honour held that the order was 
made without jurisdiction, and that it amounted, in effect, to an irregular substi-
tute for an order to wind up the company.114 Courts will not approve a scheme of 
 
106 ‘A receiver may be appointed in aid of a Mareva injunction granted prior to judgment in order to 
prevent the dissipation of the assets of the defendant company’: Lawbook Co, above n 103, 
[19.560]. See Ballabil Holdings Pty Ltd v Hospital Products Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 155. 
107 Legal execution cannot apply to property of the judgment debtor that is outside the jurisdiction. 
Neither will equitable execution be permitted unless there is some local property which can be 
applied towards discharging the debt: Lawbook Co, above n 103, [19.1210], citing Edwards & 
Co v Picard [1909] 2 KB 903. 
108 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 57(1). 
109 [1998] FCA 3017 (Unreported, Nicholson J, 29 July 1998). 
110 Nygh and Davies, above n 75, 675. 
111 Ibid, citing Dryden v Dryden (1878) 4 VLR (E) 202. 
112 Keay, above n 44, 2–3. For an example of an unsuccessful scheme of arrangement to achieve a 
similar outcome, see Re Tillers Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 202. See also Re Island Air Pty Ltd 
(1983) 7 ACLR 844. 
113 (1956) 222 LT Jo 229, as cited in Keay, above n 44, 2. 
114 See Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1990) 1 ACSR 445 on the 
reluctance of the court to exercise ex parte its inherent jurisdiction to appoint a receiver and 
manager to a company. 
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arrangement that purports to exclude or replace the winding-up procedures laid 
down in the corporations legislation.115 
The view that jurisdiction to make liquidation orders derives solely from 
statute is supported by the limited circumstances in which courts have invoked 
their inherent jurisdiction. They arise when it is necessary for the court or 
tribunal in question to be able to manage its activities appropriately.116 Inherent 
jurisdiction is limited to circumstances where it is necessary to ensure conven-
ience and fairness in legal proceedings, to prevent steps being taken that would 
render judicial proceedings inefficacious, and to prevent abuse of process.117 For 
example, where liquidators have already been appointed upon substantive 
jurisdictional grounds, courts have given directions to liquidators as part of their 
inherent jurisdiction to supervise and guide the activities of their own officers.118 
According to Martin Dockray, inherent powers arise at common law, inde-
pendently of the statutes that create the substantive jurisdiction of the courts.119 
The relationship between inherent jurisdiction and substantive jurisdiction, 
derived from statute, has been described by Menzies J of the High Court as 
follows: 
Inherent jurisdiction is not something derived by implication from statutory 
provisions conferring particular jurisdiction; if such a provision is to be consid-
ered as conferring more than is actually expressed that further jurisdiction is 
conferred by implication according to accepted standards of statutory construc-
tion and it would be inaccurate to describe it as ‘inherent jurisdiction’, which, 
as the name indicates, requires no authorizing provision.120 
So far as actual decisions on an inherent jurisdiction to order a liquidation are 
concerned, the matter has arisen both in respect of local and foreign companies. 
In Re Kalblue Pty Ltd,121 a case concerning a local company, Young J held that 
the former general law remedy of winding-up available to courts exists where it 
is ‘just and equitable’ that a company be wound up. His Honour also relied upon 
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 23, which states that the Supreme Court ‘shall 
have all jurisdiction which may be necessary for the administration of justice in 
New South Wales’. The case concerned Kalblue Pty Ltd (‘Kalblue’), which had 
 
115 Brian Cassidy Electrical Industries Pty Ltd (in prov liq) v Attalex Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 52. 
On the argument that a proposed deed of company arrangement is a winding-up by another 
name, see Young v Sherman (2002) 20 ACLC 149, 168 (Austin J). 
116 Martin Dockray, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction to Regulate Civil Proceedings’ (1997) 113 Law 
Quarterly Review 120, 127. See also passing comments in R v Crown Court at Norwich; Ex 
parte Belsham [1992] 1 All ER 394, 404–6 (Watkins LJ). 
117 The other set of circumstances is to act in aid of superior courts and in aid or control of inferior 
courts and tribunals: see Keith Mason, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1983) 57 Austra-
lian Law Journal 449; Justice Paul de Jersey, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court’ 
(1985) 15 Queensland Law Society Journal 325. 
118 Re J W Murphy & P C Allen (1996) 19 ACSR 569, 570 (McLelland CJ). The inherent jurisdic-
tion of the court over its own officers enables it to deny to a court-appointed liquidator rights and 
remedies, to which the liquidator is entitled by law, where the exercise of those rights or reme-
dies would, in the opinion of the court, be unfair or inequitable: Roy Goode, Principles of Cor-
porate Insolvency Law (2nd ed, 1997) 10, citing Re Condon; Ex parte James (1874) LR 9 Ch 
609. 
119 Dockray, above n 116, 123. 
120 R v Forbes; Ex parte Bevan (1972) 127 CLR 1, 7. 
121 (1994) 12 ACLC 1057 (‘Kalblue’). 
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been struck off the register by the administrative action of the Australian 
Securities Commission. The liquidator of another company, W J McNamara Pty 
Ltd (‘McNamara’), wished to challenge a transaction by which Kalblue purport-
edly obtained some security over McNamara’s assets. If this were successfully 
challenged, then the assets would be available to satisfy the creditors of McNa-
mara. The Commission appeared before the court to oppose the application to 
reinstate the registration of Kalblue unless it was placed under some sort of 
management, the controllers of Kalblue now being out of the jurisdiction. In the 
circumstances, there was no applicant who satisfied the requirements of Corpo-
rations Law s 462.122  
Young J stated that Part 5.4 of the Corporations Law did not operate as a code 
in New South Wales. His Honour referred to a pre-1844 remedy that existed 
under the general equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to wind up 
companies. This was based on treating the companies as enlarged partnerships. 
‘It is clear that the [Joint Stock Companies Winding Up Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict, 
c 111] did not abolish the former general law remedies, though after the Act it 
would be seldom that there would need to be resort to such remedies.’123 
Subsequently, in Horwath Corporate Pty Ltd v Huie,124 a case concerning a 
local unit trust, one of the questions raised was whether the trust may be wound 
up as a Part 5.7 body under Corporations Law s 583. In passing, Young J again 
referred to the circumstances surrounding the 1844 legislation: 
Although one can argue with [the] proposition [in J O’Donovan, McPherson: 
The Law of Company Liquidation (3rd ed, 1987) 2, that liquidation can take 
place only pursuant to, and in accordance with, the terms of the relevant stat-
ute], logically it does seem to accord both with the historical practice of Courts 
of Equity and with the authorities such as they are. … 
There does not appear to be any reported case before the English Joint Stock 
Companies Winding Up Act 1844, when many companies adopted the structure 
of a deed of settlement with the property held by trustees, where there was a 
winding up of the enterprise by the court. However, it may be that more exten-
sive research will find some, or it may be the answer was that because of the 
rule that all ‘shareholders’ should be parties it was just impractical to bring 
such proceedings.125 
Despite Kalblue, Master Bredmeyer of the Supreme Court of Western Austra-
lia in Western Interstate Pty Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 
considered that Corporations Law ss 462(5) and 459P(5) — both of which stated 
that ‘[e]xcept as permitted by this section, a person cannot apply for a company 
to be wound up in insolvency’ — have ousted any inherent jurisdiction to wind 
up a local company. 126  Subsequently, in Re Botar-Tatham Pty Ltd, 
 
122 While the Corporations Law references are retained where that was the relevant law at the time, 
the same sections are found in the Corporations Act. 
123 Kalblue (1994) 12 ACLC 1057, 1058. 
124 (1999) 32 ACSR 413. 
125 Ibid 415. 
126 (1995) 13 WAR 479, 481. Young CJ in Eq agrees that the corporations legislation does not 
confer on the court any sua sponte jurisdiction to order a winding-up: Re Botar-Tatham Pty Ltd 
(2001) 52 NSWLR 680, 682. 
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Young CJ in Eq noted these changes to the Corporations Law, yet repeated his 
views on inherent jurisdiction under the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW).127 
There have also been a few references to inherent jurisdiction in cases con-
cerning foreign companies where they are not registered locally and it is unclear 
whether they are carrying on business locally. As such, if companies do not 
qualify as Part 5.7 bodies, to which the liquidation provisions of Part 5.7 may 
apply,128 then the question of any other basis for jurisdiction to wind them up 
becomes critical. In Davidson v Global Investments International Ltd, Acting 
Master Chapman held that the ‘jurisdiction to wind up a company is a purely 
statutory one’129 under the corporations legislation. Accordingly, because the 
particular foreign company was neither registered nor carrying on business 
locally, the Supreme Court of Western Australia lacked jurisdiction to order its 
winding-up. No other law would vest the necessary jurisdiction in the Court on 
the facts as they were presented. 
This is to be contrasted with a passing comment by Young J in Re New Cap 
Reinsurance Corporation Holdings Ltd, in the context of an application to 
appoint a provisional liquidator to an unregistered foreign company which 
carried on business within the jurisdiction: 
I put aside the probability that this court may have some inherent power to ap-
point a provisional or final liquidator in respect of the assets of a foreign corpo-
ration which is not a Part 5.7 body. I merely mention this in case it be thought 
that I had excluded this possibility.130 
Lunn [No 2]131 also concerned an application for winding-up under Corpora-
tions Act s 583, although it required determination of whether it was a Part 5.7 
body, not based on it being a foreign company, but rather on whether it was a 
registrable Australian body.132 Cardiff was incorporated in 1863 under its own 
incorporation Act prior to the general Companies Act 1874 (NSW) which 
introduced incorporation of companies by registration. Cardiff had been dormant 
for many years, but in 1989, proceedings were instituted which resulted in the 
appointment of a receiver in 1996. At that stage, it appeared that no directors 
were validly in office, although there were considerable assets resulting from a 
sale of land. It also appeared that Mr Lunn was the only member who could be 
 
127 (2001) 52 NSWLR 680, 683. The equivalent provision in the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 
1991 (Qld) s 8(1) was repealed in 2001. There is no such equivalent provision in South Austra-
lia, Tasmania, Victoria or Western Australia. 
128 Further, not being registered locally, Corporations Act s 601CL(14) cannot apply even if it were 
being wound up in its place of incorporation. 
129 (1995) 125 FLR 409, 418, citing Re Lloyd Generale Italiano (1885) 29 Ch D 219, 220 
(Pearson J). The court distinguished English cases and Re Kailis Groote Eylandt Fisheries Pty 
Ltd [No 3] (1977) 17 SASR 35 on the basis of different statutory provisions: first, s 583(c)(i) 
confines carrying on business or having a place of business to Australia; and second, the English 
legislation referred to unregistered companies whereas the Australian legislation refers to a 
pt 5.7 body. In Re Lloyd Generale Italiano (1885) 29 Ch D 219, the court refused a winding-up 
order of a foreign company with no branch office or assets in England; rather it had only carried 
on business through agents. Note that in addition to corporations’ legislation, there may be 
special legislation on winding up entities such as insurance companies or banks. 
130 (1999) 32 ACSR 234, 236. 
131 (2003) 173 FLR 63. 
132 Ibid 69 (Barrett J). 
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traced. Although the circumstances were such that the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales accepted that a case had been made out for winding up Cardiff on 
the ‘just and equitable ground’, it was necessary to consider whether the Court 
had jurisdiction to do so.133  
The Court held (for reasons that will be discussed below)134 that it had no 
jurisdiction to make the order under Corporations Act s 583 as Cardiff was not a 
Part 5.7 body. It also concluded that no other provision in the Corporations Act 
conferred jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court of New South Wales or any other 
‘Court’ (as defined by that Act) to make a winding-up order in respect of Cardiff. 
A further ground argued by Mr Lunn was that a court of equity may, in the 
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, wind up or dissolve corporations. Barrett J 
noted that, while a court might dissolve an unincorporated joint stock company 
through the exercise of general equitable jurisdiction, now reflected in the 
Partnership Act 1892 (NSW), it would, in such circumstances, in effect be 
dissolving a bond ‘that the parties themselves [had] created.’135 His Honour went 
on to say: 
But once Parliament has caused such a company or body of proprietors to be 
incorporated as ‘one body politic and corporate’, a new and separate bond is 
superimposed by the legislature and it is for the legislature alone to provide the 
means of putting an end to the perpetual succession it thereby creates.136 
His Honour distinguished the Kalblue decision, noting that the court in that 
case was making ‘an order of the kind clearly envisaged by the legislation in 
respect of a body squarely within its contemplation, even though the order had 
not been sought by anyone competent under the legislation to seek it.’ 137 
Barrett J concluded that: 
The Court’s inherent jurisdiction, while broad, is not unlimited. In particular it 
does not permit the Court to do things which, expressly or by necessary impli-
cation, parliament has precluded. … 
Conscious as I am that this outcome is unsatisfactory for Mr Lunn as appar-
ently the sole traceable member of a corporation in respect of which a case for 
winding up on the just and equitable ground has been shown, I regret that no 
winding up order can be made.138  
Cardiff was finally wound up pursuant to ss 469 and 470 of the Companies 
(New South Wales) Code (as continued in force by the Corporations (New South 
Wales) Act 1990 (NSW)) and based on circumstances existing before 1 January 
1991, that made it just and equitable for the company to be wound up.139  
 
133 Ibid 65 (Barrett J). 
134 See below Part IV. 
135 Lunn [No 2] (2003) 173 FLR 63, 69. 
136 Ibid 69–70. 
137 Ibid 70. At 70, his Honour continued: ‘Whether or not that decision was correct (and I note that 
it was not followed in Western Interstate Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 13 
WAR 479), it has no bearing on the present case.’ 
138 Lunn [No 2] (2003) 173 FLR 63, 71. 
139 Lunn v Cardiff Coal Co [No 3] (2003) 177 FLR 411. 
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2 Jurisdiction in Proceedings during the Course of a Liquidation  
In the case of an involuntary insolvency administration, the threshold issue is 
whether a court will make an order for the winding-up of a company and 
simultaneously appoint a liquidator. The special jurisdictional rules for such 
proceedings are discussed in more detail in the next Part140 and do not apply to 
proceedings discussed here, which concern litigation arising during the course of 
an insolvency administration. 
Collective insolvency administrations often involve court proceedings. Some 
are matters for which the insolvency is merely incidental, whereas others are 
necessarily linked with a liquidation.141 
Incidental matters include the debtor’s pre-insolvency rights and liabilities, the 
validity of which should be differentiated from questions of the impact of 
insolvency law on those rights and interests.142 The preservation and realisation 
of property may raise issues of the validity of creditors’ alleged ‘security’, the 
proper ownership of property held by debtor-related parties, and the validity of 
devices such as Romalpa clauses, resulting trusts, constructive trusts and 
equitable liens. The adjudication on claims may require determination of their 
validity under contract, tort, or industrial law.  
In an early 19th century English case, Halford v Gillow, Shadwell V-C stated: 
the jurisdiction in bankruptcy has authority to deal only with that which is the 
bankrupt’s estate; but has no power to determine what is the bankrupt’s estate. 
If the question be a legal one it must be tried at law; and if it be an equitable 
one, it must be decided in this Court. But when you have determined what is 
the property of the bankrupt, the whole administration of it falls under the ju-
risdiction of the Court in bankruptcy.143 
Thus Ralph Brubaker refers to a bifurcation of jurisdiction in respect of bank-
ruptcy matters in English law between: (1) bankruptcy jurisdiction over the 
property comprising the divisible estate and its administration for the benefit of 
the bankrupt’s creditors; and (2) the jurisdiction to determine whether property 
belonged in the bankrupt’s estate. The latter required an ordinary suit in the 
appropriate court.144 
Those proceedings for which an insolvency administration is a prerequisite are 
diverse and may occur at any stage in the administration. In a liquidation, 
proceedings that may arise solely because of the insolvency administration 
 
140 See below Part IV. 
141 Gourdain v Nadler (C-133/78) [1979] ECR 733 held that to qualify for the exemption under 
Brussels Convention, opened for signature 27 September 1968, 8 ILM 229, art 1(2) (entered into 
force 1 February 1973) proceedings ‘must derive directly from the bankruptcy or winding-up 
and be closely connected with [such] proceedings’. A court must distinguish ‘between proceed-
ings which can only arise as a consequence of a bankruptcy from those which may exist inde-
pendently of bankruptcy, but arise out of the circumstances of one’: Alan Dashwood, Richard 
Hacon and Robin White (eds), A Guide to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention 
(1978) 77. 
142 Goode, above n 118, 498, 502; Jay Lawrence Westbrook and Donald Trautman, ‘Conflict of 
Laws Issues in International Insolvencies’ in Jacob Ziegel (ed), Current Developments in Inter-
national and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (1994) 661. 
143 (1842) 13 Sim 44, 50; 60 ER 18, 20 (emphasis in original). 
144 Brubaker, above n 88, 263–4. 
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include summons to examine directors and others associated with a company 
about its examinable affairs.145 The preservation and realisation of the divisible 
property may result in litigation initiated by the liquidator to claw property back 
into the estate through setting aside voidable transactions146 or to claim compen-
sation from company officers for insolvent trading. Even in the distribution 
phase, the court may be called upon to resolve disputes over proof of claims or 
priority of payments.147  
If the court has jurisdiction to make an order commencing a local liquidation, 
then jurisdiction to initiate proceedings during the course of the administration 
should follow.148  It may well be that the respondent in such proceedings is 
outside the jurisdiction — for example a director to be summonsed for examina-
tion — whereas the insolvent company is clearly subject to the jurisdiction and 
hence to being wound up locally.149 The local court has jurisdiction to issue the 
summons and it becomes a matter of local practice and procedure whether to 
permit service of the summons outside the jurisdiction.150 
IV  JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE IN  A MULTI-STATE LIQUIDATION  
In the case of company liquidations, an Australian court, exercising jurisdic-
tion under the Corporations Act, has adjudicatory authority to wind up a com-
pany incorporated within Australia. 151  The jurisdictional requirements for a 
company incorporated outside the jurisdiction are not as clear as those for 
bankruptcy proceeding. In the case of the involuntary winding-up of insolvent 
foreign companies, there is no specific section in the Corporations Act.152 
An Australian court has jurisdiction under the Corporations Act to wind up a 
foreign company under Part 5.7 (the central provision being s 583), and under 
s 601CL(14) where a registered foreign company is already being wound up in 
 
145 Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 388 (Brennan CJ and Toohey J) where their Honours note 
that the incidental character of the function of a court in conducting an examination and the 
traditional supervision exercised by the court in performing it are sufficient to stamp it with a 
judicial character. 
146 Staff Engineered Membranes Pty Ltd (in liq) v Synflex Industries (International) Inc [1984] 2 
NSWLR 116. 
147 Corporations Act s 1321. 
148 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2000) <http://www.hcch.net/upload/ 
wop/jdgmpd11.pdf> does not apply to ‘insolvency, composition and analogous proceedings’ 
(art 1(2)(e)) and so the question arises as to whether such disputes would be covered by such a 
convention. See also Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, opened for signature 
30 June 2005, 44 ILM 1294, art 2(2)(e) (not yet in force). 
149 Service out of the jurisdiction of an examination summons under Corporations Act s 596B was 
ordered where the respondent had knowledge of the issue of proceedings prior to leaving the 
jurisdiction: Joye v Sheahan (1996) 62 FCR 417. 
150 On local orders to examine officers abroad, see Re Sherlock (1991) 102 ALR 156; Re Absolutely 
Fabulous Exhibitions & Events (Management) Pty Ltd (1997) 25 ACSR 577; Fiorentino v Irons 
(1997) 79 FCR 327. See also Re Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd (in liq) [1993] Ch 345. 
151 Incorporation signifies formation and registration. This differs from the registration of a foreign 
company incorporated elsewhere. 
152 This is also the case in England: Philip Smart, Cross-Border Insolvency (2nd ed, 1998) 93. 
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its place of origin. It may arguably also make a winding-up order under s 581 as 
a result of a request from a foreign court for assistance.153 
Under Part 5.7, the jurisdiction of an Australian court to wind up a foreign 
company requires: 
(i) its local registration under Chapter 5B; or 
(ii) the fact that it carries on business in Australia under s 21.154 
The relevance of local registration under Chapter 5B lies in the exhaustive s 9 
definition of a ‘Part 5.7 body’: 
 (a) a registrable body that is a registrable Australian body and: 
 (i) is registered under Division 1 of Part 5B.2; or 
 (ii) is not registered under that Division but carries on business155 in 
this jurisdiction and outside its place of origin; or 
 (b) a registrable body that is a foreign company and: 
 (i) is registered under Division 2 of Part 5B.2; or 
 (ii) is not registered under that Division but carries on business in 
Australia; or 
 (c) a partnership, association or other body (whether a body corporate or 
not) that consists of more than 5 members and that is not a registrable 
body. 
In Lunn [No 2], the Supreme Court of New South Wales found that Cardiff 
was a ‘registrable body’ and a ‘registrable Australian body’.156 As it was in fact 
not registered, it was necessary to consider whether it carried on business and, if 
so, in which jurisdiction or jurisdictions. Barrett J held that ‘[o]n the whole and 
in light of the specifications of s 21, the better view must be that, as it has assets 
which are apparently being administered by the receiver, it does carry on 
business.’157 However, Cardiff did not carry on business ‘outside its place of 
origin’,158 being New South Wales, and so it did not satisfy any of paras (a), (b) 
or (c) of the definition. If in fact Cardiff had been a multi-state corporation, then 
it may well have been wound up under Part 5.7.159  
The issue of whether a company has been carrying on business in Australia has 
been the subject of a number of recent cases. Australian Securities and Invest-
 
153 But see Dick v McIntosh [2001] FCA 1008 (Unreported, Cooper J, 31 July 2001) [22], where the 
Federal Court held that the equivalent Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 29 does not provide for the 
granting of a second sequestration order. 
154 For a discussion of the introduction of this requirement into the English Companies Act 1862, 
25 & 26 Vict, c 89, see K Lipstein, ‘Jurisdiction To Wind Up Foreign Companies’ (1952) 11 
Cambridge Law Journal 198, 201–4. 
155 The concept of ‘carrying on business in Australia’ is elaborated in Corporations Act s 21. For 
example, it involves having a place of business in Australia (which includes establishing a share 
registration office or dealing with property situated in Australia: s 21(2)(a)) and does not neces-
sarily follow from the events listed in s 21(3) (such as being a party to legal proceedings or 
holding property in Australia). 
156 (2003) 173 FLR 63. 
157 Ibid 68. 
158 Corporations Act s 9. 
159 Lunn [No 2] (2003) 173 FLR 63, 68 (Barrett J). 
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ments Commission v International Unity Insurance (General) Ltd,160 involved an 
application under s 583 to wind up International Unity Insurance (General) Ltd 
(‘International Unity’), a subsidiary of a Solomon Islands company. International 
Unity was found to be ‘a foreign company not registered under Division 2 of 
Part 5B.2 of the Act and a corporation that has carried on business, but has now 
ceased to carry on that business, in Australia.’161 Lander J held that ‘a company 
does not cease to be a Part 5.7 body when it ceases to carry on business at least 
for the purposes of s 583’.162 In particular, his Honour noted that the application 
to wind up International Unity relied in part on the ground in s 583(c)(i) that the 
Part 5.7 body had ceased to carry on business.163 
The question of the effect of a foreign company having ceased to carry on 
business was also considered by McMurdo J in Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission v Edwards,164 which concerned a number of companies 
alleged to be operating unregistered managed investment schemes. One of the 
companies, Carsworthy Ltd (‘Carsworthy’), was incorporated outside Australia. 
Although it was a foreign company and a registrable body, it was not registered 
under Division 2 of Part 5B.2 and thus, to qualify as a Part 5.7 body, it had to 
carry on business in Australia.165 Carsworthy’s business was to operate a scheme, 
the so-called ‘Car Club’. Its conduct involving a Mr Robinson was found to 
satisfy the Luckins v Highway Motel (Carnarvon) Pty Ltd166 definition of ‘a 
succession of acts designed to advance some enterprise of the company pursued 
with a view to pecuniary gain’.167 However, the scheme no longer operated and 
there was no evidence that the company still carried on business in Australia.  
Unlike International Unity, the application for winding-up did not rely upon 
the ground that Carsworthy had ceased to carry on business in Australia 
(s 583(c)(i)) but that it was just and equitable that it should be wound up 
(s 583(c)(ii)). The court held that, whichever ground was relied upon, Carswor-
thy was a Part 5.7 body for which a winding-up order could be made. As 
McMurdo J stated: 
Once a registrable body that is a foreign company becomes registered under 
Div 2 of Pt 5B.2 or carries on business in Australia, it becomes a Pt 5.7 body 
which is thereafter susceptible to an order for winding up, regardless of 
whether it subsequently becomes deregistered or ceases to carry on business in 
Australia. Once it becomes a Pt 5.7 body it has effectively submitted to the ju-
risdiction conferred by the Act for its winding up.168 Such an interpretation of 
the definition of a Pt 5.7 body is clearly beneficial to the operation of Pt 5.7. 
The contrary interpretation would enable a foreign company, which carried on 
business here illegally by being unregistered, to avoid an order for winding up 
 
160 [2004] FCA 1060 (Unreported, Lander J, 19 August 2004) (‘International Unity’). 
161 Ibid [17]. 
162 Ibid [20]. 
163 Ibid [22]. 
164 (2004) 22 ACLC 1469 (‘Edwards’). 
165 Corporations Act s 9. 
166 (1975) 133 CLR 164. 
167 Ibid 178 (Gibbs J). 
168 Citing Ron Harmer, ‘Report for Australia’ in Ian F Fletcher (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency: 
Comparative Dimensions (1990) 46, as quoted in Keay, above n 44, 688. 
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in Australia by ceasing its business here just ahead of a winding up application. 
Especially where an expressed circumstance for winding up is the cessation of 
business in Australia, it is difficult to see that such a limitation upon the 
operation of Pt 5.7 was intended.169 
Both International Unity and Edwards were considered recently in Camp-
bell v Gebo Investments (Labuan) Ltd. 170  This case concerned a company, 
LifeWealth 8 Ltd (‘LifeWealth’), which was incorporated under a Malaysian 
federal statute and not registered in Australia. An application was brought to set 
aside an order appointing a provisional liquidator of the company on the basis 
that it was not a body in respect of which the court had jurisdiction under the 
Corporations Act to make the order.  
The applicants argued that both International Unity and Edwards were 
wrongly decided because of a ‘misplaced emphasis on the reference in 
s 583(c)(i) to the power to make a winding up order where the body “has ceased 
to carry on business in this jurisdiction”.’171 This was argued to overlook 
the fact that one species of Part 5.7 body is a foreign company registered under 
Div 2 of Pt 5B.2. Once so registered, a foreign company remains a Part 5.7 
body whether or not it carries on business in Australia. In the case of a Part 5.7 
body not so registered, the applicants emphasise, carrying on of business in 
Australia is an essential ingredient of the Part 5.7 body status.172 
Nevertheless, Barrett J determined that LifeWealth ‘may become the subject of 
a winding up order under s 583 if it has, at any time, carried on business in 
Australia. The jurisdiction to appoint a provisional liquidator rests on the same 
foundation.’173 Moreover, s 582(3) (winding-up of a dissolved foreign company) 
clearly recognises that the carrying on of business within the jurisdiction at the 
time of the making of the winding up order under that section is not an essen-
tial component of the power to make the order. And, particularly in light of 
s 601CL(14), s 582(3) cannot be regarded as confined to bodies registered un-
der Div 2 of Pt 5B.2.174 
Further, Barrett J stated that he was not of the opinion that the decisions of the 
courts exercising coordinate jurisdiction were plainly wrong and so as a first 
instance judge deciding a matter under a Commonwealth statute creating a 
national scheme of regulation, he should follow the decisions of International 
Unity and Edwards:175 
I accept that the link coming from a concluded course of carrying on business 
is sufficient in principle, and as a matter of statutory interpretation, to make 
 
169 Edwards (2004) 22 ACLC 1469, 1480. 
170 (2005) 190 FLR 209. An interesting dimension to the facts surrounding the company’s alleged 
‘carrying on of business’ was that it involved so-called ecommerce — some 2000 people, resi-
dent in Australia, had responded to LifeWealth’s website and become licensees for the purposes 
of a stimulated stock market activity by making credit card payments by means of the website. 
171 Ibid 217 (Barrett J). 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid 218. 
174 Ibid 217. 
175 This would also be in accordance with his Honour’s observations in Re Wayland as Liquidator of 
ABC Containerline NV (in liq) (2005) 52 ACSR 750. 
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available the s 583 jurisdiction for reasons given in the two cases [International 
Unity and Edwards]. It cannot be accepted that a foreign company that has 
carried on business in Australia, with all the consequences that that entails 
(including, in most cases, incurring debts payable to Australian residents) is put 
beyond the reach of Australian winding up simply by retreating to its 
homeland. If, in reality, it has left no legacy requiring administration in 
Australia (assuming grounds for winding up are shown), any application for a 
winding up order is likely to be refused on discretionary grounds. But if matters 
cognisable in an Australian winding up have been left behind, the jurisdiction 
to wind up is, in my view, ongoing: cf Banque des Marchands de Moscou 
(Koupetschesky) v Kindersley (1950) 66 TLR (PT 1) 1147. I respectfully adopt 
and endorse, in particular, the statements in [41] of McMurdo J’s judgment in 
ASIC v Edwards.176 
Even if these technical statutory requirements are satisfied, questions arise on 
whether some additional jurisdictional connection is required from the perspec-
tive of private international law principles. The authorities have until recently 
been unclear on whether the connecting factors go to the existence of jurisdiction 
or whether they are relevant to the exercise of such jurisdiction (that is, the 
declining thereof).177  
Re Norfolk Shipping Line Pty Ltd178 concerned a company incorporated in 
Norfolk Island for the purpose of providing a shipping service between Sydney, 
Lord Howe Island, Norfolk Island and New Zealand. Its only asset was a ship 
situated in Auckland Harbour at the time of hearing. It had never been registered 
in New South Wales as a foreign company, nor did it have an office in that 
jurisdiction. At all material times, its affairs had been administered in New South 
Wales by its agent, a New South Wales company. Apart from loans from share-
holders, the company owed approximately $1 million to creditors in New South 
Wales.  
As the company had no office or place of business in New South Wales, the 
question arose as to whether it was carrying on business there. The Supreme 
Court of New South Wales held on the facts that it was carrying on more than 
isolated transactions and, in all the circumstances, it was pursuing activities with 
a view to pecuniary gain in New South Wales,179 and thus the company was held 
to have been carrying on business in New South Wales.180 Accordingly, the 
Court had jurisdiction insofar as the company was required to be registered.  
Nevertheless, Young J questioned whether additional links to the jurisdiction 
were required before he had power to wind up the Norfolk Island company. 
Reference was made to English181 and Australian182 cases and, although they 
referred to similar, not identical legislation, the Court held that: 
 
176 Campbell v Gebo Investments (Labuan) Ltd (2005) 190 FLR 209, 218. For McMurdo J’s 
comments, see also above n 169 and accompanying text. 
177 In Re Norfolk Island Shipping Line Pty Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 990, 991, Young J distinguished 
English cases on the basis of legislative differences such that some of the factors they referred to 
‘do not go to jurisdiction but go to discretion’. 
178  (1988) 6 ACLC 990. 
179 See Luckins v Highway Motel (Carnarvon) Pty Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 164, 178 (Gibbs J). 
180 Re Norfolk Shipping Line Pty Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 990, 991 (Young J). 
181 Re Compania Merabello San Nicholas SA [1973] Ch 75 (the sole English asset was a claim for 
indemnity against its English insurers for which the petitioning creditor had a right of subroga-
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The law as to whether assets negligible or not are absolutely required as a basis 
of jurisdiction is not yet certain. It may be that a Judge in this Court could say 
that so long as there is some commercial advantage in making a winding up or-
der in New South Wales, an order may be made. On the other hand, no case has 
gone further than … requiring ‘negligible assets’ in the jurisdiction.183 
Given that there were no assets in New South Wales, Young J expressed doubts 
as to whether he had jurisdiction in the matter. Finally, his Honour justified the 
appointment of a provisional liquidator on the basis of the Commonwealth 
cross-vesting legislation with Norfolk Island.184 
Richard Fisher argues that all that is required to establish jurisdiction to wind 
up a foreign company is the satisfaction of the statutory requirements of registra-
tion or business activity within the jurisdiction: 
Once that connection [carrying on business] is established, the Court may exer-
cise the same powers and is subject to the same constraints as though it were 
considering an application to wind up a company incorporated or taken to be 
incorporated under the Law.185 
In 1937, John Bray186 stated that with the enactment of a specific provision to 
wind up an unregistered company, 187  an implied power to do so no longer 
existed and the whole extent of the power to wind up foreign companies was 
contained in that section. Yet, 40 years later, as Bray CJ in Re Kailis Groote 
Eylandt Fisheries Pty Ltd [No 3],188 his Honour referred to a provision in the 
Companies Act 1962 (SA)189 for winding up foreign companies, defined as those 
‘incorporated outside the State’,190 and commented: 
Undoubtedly this company is such a company. It by no means follows, how-
ever, that this Court has jurisdiction to wind it up. Clearly it cannot, under the 
ordinary rules of private international law, order any company in the world to 
be wound up. There must be a sufficient nexus with [the forum]. … 
[Counsel’s] argument treats the absence of local assets as a matter going to dis-
cretion rather than to jurisdiction. I do not so regard it.191 
 
tion in the event of the company’s winding-up); Re a Company (No 00359 of 1987) [1988] Ch 
210 (the only asset and possible benefit to creditors derived from actions against the directors). 
182 Re Kailis Groote Eylandt Fisheries Pty Ltd [No 3] (1977) 17 SASR 35; Re Buildmat (Australia) 
Pty Ltd (1981) 5 ACLR 689. 
183 Re Norfolk Shipping Line Pty Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 990, 991 (Young J) (emphasis added). 
184 See Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth). See also Re Atlantic Isle Shipping Co 
Inc (1988) 14 ACLR 232. 
185 Richard Fisher, ‘Cross-Border Insolvencies: An Australian Perspective’ in Bruce E Leonard and 
Christopher W Besant (eds), Current Issues in Cross-Border Insolvency and Reorganisations 
(1994) 153, 158. See also Geoff Sutherland, ‘Issues in Cross-Border Insolvency Law in Austra-
lia’ (1998) 12(2) Commercial Law Quarterly 7, 9–10. 
186 John Bray, Bankruptcy and the Winding Up of Companies in Private International Law (LLD 
Thesis, The University of Adelaide, 1937) 55, referring to expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 
187 Companies Act 1934 (SA) s 346. 
188 (1977) 17 SASR 35. 
189 Companies Act 1962 (SA) s 315, a precursor to Corporations Act s 583. 
190 Companies Act 1962 (SA) s 314(1) defined ‘unregistered company’ to include ‘foreign 
company’ for the purposes of the div V (which included s 315), and s 5 defined ‘foreign com-
pany’ as a company ‘incorporated outside the State’. 
191 (1977) 17 SASR 35, 38–44. 
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In the chapter on ‘Private International Law’ in the fourth edition of McPher-
son: The Law of Company Liquidation,192 reference was made to the arguments 
by Richard Fisher193 (based on legislative change since the earlier Australian and 
English cases) and Ron Harmer 194  (that registration or the carrying on of 
business indicates the foreign company has submitted to the local jurisdiction 
and that presence or absence of assets goes to discretion rather than jurisdiction) 
that nothing more was required to establish jurisdiction: 
However, this area still awaits a decision by a bold Australian spirit who is pre-
pared to go further than Re Norfolk Island Shipping Line Pty Ltd. Although it 
may be argued that Australia takes a broad approach to matters of jurisdiction 
[under the doctrine of forum non conveniens], it is submitted that a local wind-
ing up order will be refused unless certain other factors are also present, even 
where statutory conditions are fulfilled.195 
The requirement of a sufficient connection with the jurisdiction has also been 
noted in Australian private international law texts. 196  Yet, recent case law 
indicates this is no longer required. Such a position is consistent with the 
Australian approach to forum non conveniens.197 
The question was noted, but left unanswered, in Kintsu Co Ltd v Peninsular 
Group Ltd,198 where Santow J at first instance commented that as the defendant 
was both registered as a foreign company and had assets and creditors in New 
South Wales, whether it had sufficient connection with the jurisdiction of New 
South Wales under private international law principles did not arise as a live 
issue.199 
In Edwards, McMurdo J referred to the suggestion in an earlier edition of 
McPherson: The Law of Company Liquidation that there are other essential 
conditions of the court’s jurisdiction beyond the statutory requirements.200 His 
Honour distinguished the earlier cases on the basis that they did not prescribe a 
nexus between the company and the place governed by the statute, whereas the 
Corporations Act contains a nexus in the definition of the Part 5.7 body, holding 
that: 
 
192 Rosalind Mason, ‘Private International Law’ in Andrew Keay, McPherson: The Law of Company 
Liquidation (4th ed, 1999) 680. 
193 Fisher, above n 185, 158: ‘Once that connection [carrying on business] is established, the Court 
may exercise the same powers and is subject to the same constraints as though it were consider-
ing an application to wind up a company incorporated or taken to be incorporated under the 
Law.’ See also Sutherland, above n 185, 7, 9–10. 
194 Harmer, above n 168, 46. 
195 Rosalind Mason, ‘Private International Law’, above n 192, 688 (citations omitted). 
196 See, eg, Nygh and Davies, above n 75, 664; Sykes and Pryles, above n 4, 402–3. On the English 
courts’ requirement for a sufficient connection, see Kate Dawson, ‘Foreign Companies and 
Extraterritorial Aspects of the Insolvency Act 1986’ (1999) 8 International Insolvency Review 49, 
52. 
197 See below Part V(B). 
198 (1998) 27 ACSR 679. 
199 This matter was not addressed in the Court of Appeal decision: Peninsular Group Ltd v Kintsu 
Co Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 534. 
200 (2004) 22 ACLC 1469, 1480, citing J O’Donovan, McPherson: The Law of Company Liquida-
tion (3rd ed, 1987) 463. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.50.05 PM — page 173 of 46
  
2006] Local Proceedings in a Multi-State Liquidation 173 
     
Once it is determined that a foreign company is a body so defined, there is 
jurisdiction to order its winding up upon proof of a relevant ground. Matters 
such as the presence or otherwise of assets or creditors within this jurisdiction 
are relevant considerations to the exercise of the discretion to order winding up, 
but they do not go to jurisdiction. That is how they were characterised by 
Young J in Re Norfolk Island Shipping Line Pty Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 990; 
(1988) 14 ACLR 229 and by Santow J in Re The Peninsula Group Ltd (1998) 
16 ACLC 985 at 991–992; (1998) 27 ACSR 679 at 686.201 
As commented above on the jurisdiction to adjudicate between parties in a 
liquidation, special statutory jurisdictional rules apply to whether a court will 
order the liquidation of an insolvent debtor.202 These rules are subject to the 
court’s discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction in the case of a foreign 
debtor and to the court’s statutory discretion when exercising the jurisdiction to 
decline to make such an order.  
V  THE EXERCISE  OF  JURISDICTION IN  A MULTI-STATE 
LIQUIDATION  
A  Part 5.7 Liquidation 
Subject to any necessary adaptation, pursuant to Part 5.7 of the Corporations 
Act, a foreign company which is a Part 5.7 body may be wound up in accordance 
with Chapter 5.203 In fact, a Part 5.7 body may be wound up even if it is being 
wound up, or has ceased to exist, in its place of incorporation.204 
The circumstances in which a foreign company may be wound up are listed in 
s 583(c), and include its dissolution and its ceasing to carry on business in 
Australia.205 Perhaps the most common situation in which a winding-up order is 
made occurs where a company is unable to pay its debts. This inability to pay 
debts is deemed by s 585 to occur, inter alia, where there is failure to comply 
with a statutory demand206 or an unsatisfied execution or other enforcement of 
an Australian or foreign judgment.207 
In Peninsular Group Ltd v Kintsu Co Ltd,208 the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal considered the impact of the introduction of the detailed statutory 
demand provisions of Part 5.4 on Part 5.7 — in particular s 585(a) and its 
reference to noncompliance with a demand. The Court held that the comprehen-
sive terms of ss 583 and 585 meant that the Part 5.4 provisions did not apply 
where a party sought to wind up a body other than a company, such as a foreign 
company, under Part 5.7. 
 
201 Edwards (2004) 22 ACLC 1469, 1481. 
202 See above Part III(D)(1). 
203 One exception is that it may not be voluntarily wound up: Corporations Act s 583(b). 
204 Corporations Act s 582(3). 
205 Corporations Act s 583(c)(i). 
206 Corporations Act s 585(a). 
207 Corporations Act s 585(c). 
208 (1998) 44 NSWLR 534. 
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The significance of a winding-up under Part 5.7 was central to a s 480 applica-
tion for the release of a liquidator appointed under s 583 in Re Wayland as 
Liquidator of ABC Containerline NV (in liq).209 ABC Containerline NV (‘ABC’) 
was incorporated under the laws of Belgium, where it was ordered to be wound 
up on 5 April 1996. Prior to that time, ABC had been carrying on business in 
Australia, albeit as an unregistered foreign company. On 21 June 1999, an order 
was made by the Supreme Court of New South Wales pursuant to s 583 to wind 
up the company and to appoint a liquidator. Even though the winding-up was 
concurrent with a prior administration in ABC’s place of incorporation, Barrett J 
held it was not an ancillary administration as it would have been if the order had 
been made pursuant to s 601CL(14).210 
During the course of the local liquidation, an investigation of potential claims 
against a third party had been undertaken; however, it appeared that the 
Judge-Commissioner in the Belgian administration had decided not to pursue it. 
Since there appeared to be no local assets, the liquidator sought release under 
s 480. While 17 Australian creditors had lodged proofs of debt with the Belgian 
trustees, the local liquidator had received no proofs of debt and appeared not to 
have identified any contributories.211 
Prior to the liquidator’s release, the Court required the local creditors to be 
notified of the s 480 application, as well as a brief advertisement of the applica-
tion to alert other creditors (if any) within the jurisdiction. It noted that the effect 
of the release was a form of absolution conferred by s 481(3).212 
On the nature of the winding-up, Barrett J held: 
Although the winding up ordered by this court is, in reality of [an] ancillary 
kind, it is not, by the terms of the winding-up order (or any legislative provi-
sion), made subsidiary to the Belgian administration. The liquidator appointed 
by this court is subject to the full range of duties and responsibilities attaching 
to the office of liquidator, subject to any direction that the court itself may see 
fit to make: see Re Hibernian Merchants Ltd [1958] Ch 76; [1957] 3 All ER 97. 
As a general principle, therefore, the local liquidator should proceed in the 
manner stated by Lowe J in Re Australian Federal Life and General Assurance 
Co Ltd [1931] VLR 317 at 320; (1931) 37 ALR 291: 
The purpose of the ancillary winding up is to secure the local assets, and the 
rights of the local creditors; and the duties of the liquidators accordingly are 
to collect the local assets, to settle a list of the local contributories and also, it 
would seem, to determine the claims of local creditors. 
The fact that Mr Wayland’s appointment was procured, in substance, by the 
Belgian trustees in bankruptcy (in that they caused ABC to make the applica-
tion for the winding-up order) does not mean that he is, or may regard himself 
as, merely an instrumentality of or assistant to those trustees. As a liquidator 
appointed by this court, he is an officer of the court and makes decisions which 
 
209 (2005) 52 ACSR 750. 
210 Ibid 753. Such liquidations only apply to foreign companies registered in accordance with 
Corporations Act pt 5B.2 div 2. 
211 Ibid 756–7 (Barrett J). 
212 Ibid 758 (Barrett J). 
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are, in effect, made under the authority of the court itself: Duffy v Super Centre 
Development Corp Ltd [1967] 1 NSWR 382.213 
In a multi-state insolvency, a debtor may well have connections with a number 
of states and differing insolvency, and other laws may provide an incentive for 
creditors to seek an insolvency administration in more than one forum. In 
considering the manner in which jurisdiction should be exercised where there are 
concurrent insolvency administrations, the doctrines of forum non conveniens 
and lis alibi pendens are also relevant, as they help regulate the manner in which 
courts may defer to proceedings in another state. Anti-suit injunctions have also 
been a feature of the commercial litigation arising out of significant multi-state 
insolvencies. Finally, insolvency jurisdiction has the fundamental element that a 
bankruptcy or liquidation order is a matter of discretion for a court and, in 
certain circumstances, has been declined. 
B  Forum Non Conveniens 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is concerned with the exercise, rather 
than the existence, of jurisdiction.214 The successful plea of forum non conven-
iens — where on first principles the forum has jurisdiction, but declines to 
exercise it — may arise in two types of cases.  
The first is where the defendant is outside the jurisdiction and the plaintiff 
must seek leave of the court to serve out of the jurisdiction.215 The onus is then 
on the plaintiff to show that, although the defendant is not present, the local 
forum is not a ‘clearly inappropriate forum’.216 An insolvency example of where 
leave of the court may be required to serve a summons outside the jurisdiction is 
where a liquidator seeks to examine company directors who are outside the 
jurisdiction. In Fiorentino v Irons,217 the Federal Court granted extempore an 
Australian liquidator leave to serve a summons to attend an examination upon a 
person residing outside Australia. As the material before the Court satisfied the 
requirements of the relevant rules on originating process, orders were made to 
serve a summons personally upon an examinee in England.218 
The second may arise in proceedings for a stay. In such proceedings, a defen-
dant who has been served either within the jurisdiction or outside it, without the 
 
213 Ibid 755–6. 
214 Michael Pryles, ‘Judicial Darkness on the Oceanic Sun’ (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 774. 
215 For example, leave to serve other than an originating process: see, eg, Federal Court Rules 1979 
(Cth) O 8 r 2; Supreme Court Rules 1937 (ACT) O 12 rr 4–5; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
2005 (NSW) r 11.5; Supreme Court Rules (NT) r 7.06; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 
(Qld) r 127; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 18.07; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) 
Rules 2005 (Vic) r 7.06; Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 10 r 1. 
216 Michael Pryles, ‘Forum Non Conveniens — The Next Chapter’ (1991) 65 Australian Law 
Journal 442, 450. 
217 (1997) 79 FCR 327. 
218 Ibid 330 (Foster J) where his Honour determined that the original application for the issue of the 
summons was a proceeding of the court and the extant application by notice of motion for leave 
for its service outside Australia was a proceeding incidental to the original application or one 
relevantly in connexion with it. Accordingly Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 8 rr 1, 2 applied. 
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need for prior leave of the court,219 bears the onus of proof to establish that the 
forum is clearly inappropriate.220 
Under the approach taken in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd,221 an Aus-
tralian court, which otherwise has jurisdiction, may decline to exercise it if it 
considers itself to be a ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ for the determination of a 
dispute.222 In Voth, the High Court chose not to follow the English approach in 
Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd,223 where the House of Lords had 
considered which was the ‘more appropriate forum’. 224  That is, under the 
English approach, a stay is granted 
where the court is satisfied that there is some other available forum, having 
competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the ac-
tion, ie in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the 
parties and the ends of justice.225  
Describing the impact of the Spiliada test in England upon multi-state insol-
vency, Ian F Fletcher notes that the forum non conveniens cases dealt with 
international litigation between directly interested parties, whereas insolvency 
proceedings are collective in nature with a ‘broader spread of interests and policy 
considerations’:226 
Nevertheless, the welcome infusion of a more magnanimous, and internation-
ally sensitive spirit of approach towards the exercise of international jurisdic-
tion by English courts, from the highest level downwards, … could not fail to 
 
219 Under the rules of the Supreme Courts of New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland, 
South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria, there is no need to obtain leave in certain circumstances 
prior to service of the writ for certain proceedings: see, eg, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 
(NSW) r 11.2; Supreme Court Rules (NT) r 7.01; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) 
r 124; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 18.02; Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) r 147A; Su-
preme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 7.01. Leave, however, would be 
required before proceeding to judgment, see, eg, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) 
r 11.4; Supreme Court Rules (NT) r 7.04; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 
(Vic) r 7.04. In these cases, the defendant would be making an application to set aside the ser-
vice of the originating process outside the jurisdiction on the grounds, for example, that service 
outside the jurisdiction was not authorised by the rules or that the forum was not a convenient 
forum for trial of the proceeding: see, eg, Supreme Court Rules (NT) r 7.05; Supreme Court 
(General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 7.05. 
220 There is also a legislative test of forum non conveniens under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
2005 (NSW) r 11.7, which provides that a court may set aside a service of process outside the 
jurisdiction on the ground that the court is ‘an inappropriate’ or not a convenient forum for the 
trial of the proceedings. See Wendy Harris, ‘Life After Voth: The Application of Forum Non 
Conveniens by Australian Courts in Transnational Proceedings’ (1992) 22 Queensland Law 
Society Journal 21, 30–1. 
221 (1990) 171 CLR 538 (‘Voth’). 
222 Ibid 554 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ). That is, the forum will be clearly 
inappropriate if the local proceedings are vexatious, oppressive or an abuse of the court’s proc-
ess. In Regie National des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491, 521 (Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), the High Court declined to revisit the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens and held that the decisive consideration was that the defendants had not 
established that a trial in New South Wales would be ‘oppressive or vexatious’ to them in any 
relevant sense. 
223 [1987] AC 460 (‘Spiliada’). 
224 See ibid 477, 483 (Lord Goff). 
225 Ibid 476 (Lord Goff) (emphasis added), applying Sim v Robinow (1892) 19 R 665, 668 (Lord 
Kinnear). 
226 Ian F Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (2nd ed, 2005) [2.47]. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.50.05 PM — page 177 of 46
  
2006] Local Proceedings in a Multi-State Liquidation 177 
     
exert some influence upon the mode of decision when questions concerning the 
exercise of insolvency jurisdiction arise in subsequent cases.227 
In Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [No 2],228 the court applied the Spiliada test 
and declined to exercise jurisdiction to wind up a company (albeit not in 
insolvency). 229  According to Fletcher, although the material considerations 
would be different in the context of an insolvent company, ‘the spirit of openness 
and objectivity with which the question of appropriate venue was addressed [in 
the Harrods case] could well serve as a basis for useful development in the 
future.’230  
In determining appropriateness, the Australian and English approaches apply 
the same connecting factors listed by Lord Goff in Spiliada which relate to the 
legal and substantive relationships existing between the dispute and the state.231 
So, a different outcome would only be likely to occur under these two ap-
proaches where the court considers another forum to be more appropriate, even 
though the local forum is not clearly inappropriate. 
An example to highlight the difference between the Australian and English 
approaches would be where a creditor’s winding-up petition is presented in the 
company’s place of incorporation, although the company’s headquarters are in 
another state. Under the Australian forum non conveniens approach, the place of 
incorporation would not be determinative, and so the court may exercise 
principal jurisdiction unless it considers itself to be a ‘clearly inappropriate 
forum’. However, applying the English approach in Spiliada, parties may seek to 
prove that another state is a ‘more appropriate forum’, such as the place of its 
centre of management control.  
In Re a Company (No 00359 of 1987),232 an application was made to wind up a 
foreign company in England where the only local asset and possible benefit to 
creditors derived from actions against the directors, which only became available 
upon liquidation of the company. In the course of his judgment, Gibson J stated: 
‘It is also appropriate for the court to consider whether any other jurisdiction is 
more appropriate for the winding up of this admittedly insolvent company.’233 
Other jurisdictions considered were Liberia, with which the company appeared 
to have had nothing to do after its incorporation there, and Greece. The connec-
tions with Greece were that the company’s single asset, a bulk carrier, flew the 
Greek flag and various notices under credit facilities were required to be sent to 
the company care of an address in Greece. The High Court was satisfied that the 
company had a sufficiently close connection with England where, amongst other 
 
227 Ibid. 
228 [1992] Ch 72 (‘Harrods’). 
229 Although the company was incorporated locally, the central management control and business of 
the company was in a foreign state. The foreign state would not have given effect to a local order 
for the winding-up of the company. 
230 Ian F Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law, above n 226, [3.56]. 
231 For example, the ‘residence and availability of witnesses; the residence and places of business of 
the parties; the law of the cause; and any “legitimate jurisdictional advantage” to the plaintiff’: 
Mortensen, above n 37, 67. 
232 [1988] Ch 210. 
233 Ibid 226. 
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things, it had carried on business,234 and there were no other jurisdiction more 
appropriate for the winding-up of the company, which plainly ought to be wound 
up.235 
The English Court of Appeal again considered whether there was a ‘more 
appropriate forum’ in Re a Company (No 003102 of 1991); Ex parte Nyckeln 
Finance Co Ltd,236 finding England was the more appropriate forum in which to 
wind up the company. The winding-up process in Guernsey, Channel Islands, the 
place of incorporation, was considered by the Court to be outmoded and Portugal 
was not an appropriate jurisdiction since, although the company had assets there, 
it had no other connection with the country.237 The English jurisdiction was held 
to be appropriate on the basis that the individual who ran the company was 
present and resident in England and the petitioner was also present in England.238 
The fact that there may be concurrent insolvency proceedings and that these 
may be treated as principal and ancillary proceedings may affect the question of 
the most appropriate forum. In Re Wallace Smith Group Ltd,239 Nugee DJ stated 
that the question of whether there was a ‘more appropriate jurisdiction’ cannot be 
an essential factor in determining jurisdiction to wind up a foreign company.240 
There are cases in which the local court will make a winding-up order, which is 
ancillary to a winding-up in the place of incorporation and, in such a case, it 
cannot be said that local court was the more appropriate jurisdiction.241 His 
Honour viewed appropriateness as a matter for the exercise of the discretion to 
make the order rather than to exercise jurisdiction.242 
In the Bank of Credit & Commerce International Group insolvency, the Eng-
lish liquidation of Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA (‘BCCI’) was 
held to be ancillary to the Luxembourg adjudication in the place of incorpora-
tion. In dealing with an application by a group of creditors soon after BCCI was 
placed in provisional liquidation, and before the petition to wind it up was 
decided, Browne-Wilkinson V-C held: 
The second delicate aspect is the relationship between this court and the court 
of Luxembourg. BCCI is incorporated in Luxembourg, which prima facie is the 
court where the prime winding up proceedings, if it ever gets that far, will have 
to be conducted as being the law of the country of incorporation. Some sugges-
tions have been made that in some way it is inappropriate that that should be 
the primary administration were a winding up order to be made. That is not a 
view with which I concur in any way. There is nothing to indicate that the court 
 
234 The company incurred the debt on which the petitioning creditor, an English company, relied 
under an English loan agreement negotiated and executed in England and requiring performance 
in England: ibid. 
235 Ibid 226–7 (Gibson J). 
236 [1991] BCLC 539. 
237 Ibid 541 (Harman J). 
238 Ibid. 
239 [1992] BCLC 989. 
240 Ibid 1007. 
241 Ibid. 
242 His Honour noted that, although it was not an essential factor, it was nevertheless an important 
one for the court to consider in deciding how to exercise its discretion as to whether to wind up a 
foreign company: ibid. 
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of Luxembourg would be in some way regarded as inappropriate, if otherwise 
under the general law that is the right court to administer the matter.243  
The Australian forum non conveniens approach provides a broad basis for 
jurisdiction, under which an Australian court, which otherwise has jurisdiction, 
may decline to exercise that jurisdiction if it considers itself to be a ‘clearly 
inappropriate forum’ for the determination of a dispute. This expansive approach 
to the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the decisions in International 
Unity, 244  Edwards 245  and Campbell v Gebo Investments (Labuan) Ltd 246 
regarding the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the winding-up of the various 
unregistered foreign companies.247 
C  Lis Alibi Pendens 
Concurrent proceedings indicate the potential relevance of the doctrine of lis 
alibi pendens to the exercise of jurisdiction in a multi-state insolvency. A court 
may order a stay on local proceedings where proceedings have already com-
menced and are pending in a foreign forum and the interests of justice would not 
be well served by having two courts in different jurisdictions giving judgment in 
the same case.248 
In Henry v Henry,249 a matrimonial proceedings case, the majority of the High 
Court of Australia held that application of the Voth250 test of ‘clearly inappropri-
ate forum’ was intended to avoid simultaneous proceedings in different countries 
with respect to the same controversy. It is ‘prima facie vexatious and oppressive, 
in the strict sense of those terms, to commence a second or subsequent action in 
the courts of this country if an action is already pending with respect to the 
matter in issue.’251 
Correspondence of subject matter is an important issue where proceedings are 
pending in another jurisdiction. Henry involved identical parties and the same 
subject matter (the parties’ marital relationship), whereas different claims were 
being made in the United States and New South Wales in CSR Ltd v Cigna 
Insurance Australia Ltd.252 Where the issues are not the same, the test is not 
 
243 This comment was cited in Re Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA [No 10] [1997] Ch 
213, 225 (Scott V-C). 
244 [2004] FCA 1060 (Unreported, Lander J, 19 August 2004). 
245 (2004) 22 ACLC 1469. 
246 (2005) 190 FLR 209. 
247 Such an approach was adopted on the basis that the foreign companies in these cases all satisfied 
the statutory definition of a pt 5.7 body. 
248 The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398, 412 (Lord Diplock). On negative declarations in general, see 
Andrew Bell, ‘The Negative Declaration in Transnational Litigation’ (1995) 111 Law Quarterly 
Review 674. 
249 (1995) 185 CLR 571 (‘Henry’). 
250 (1990) 171 CLR 538. 
251 Henry (1995) 185 CLR 571, 591 (Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). Courts should 
strive, to the extent permitted by Voth, to avoid a situation of lis alibi pendens, however, there is 
a risk that parties may thereby be encouraged to participate in a ‘race to the filing counter’: Peter 
Nygh, ‘Voth in the Family Court Re-Visited: The High Court Pronounces Forum Conveniens and 
Lis Alibi Pendens’ (1996) 10 Australian Journal of Family Law 163, 170. 
252 (1997) 189 CLR 345 (‘CSR’). The different claims arose out of a dispute over indemnities with 
respect to asbestos-related claims in the United States. 
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whether the Australian court is a ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ for the litigation 
of the issues involved in the Australian proceedings, but rather whether, having 
regard to the controversy as a whole, the Australian proceedings are vexatious or 
oppressive (in the Voth sense of those terms).253 
The possibility of concurrent bankruptcies or liquidations has long been rec-
ognised in insolvency law and managed through primary and ancillary admini-
strations, rather than staying a local proceeding.254 A leading bankruptcy case on 
this issue is Re Artola Hermanos; Ex parte Châle.255 The debtors were members 
of a partnership with its head office in Paris. The firm was declared bankrupt in 
Paris under the laws of France and a syndic appointed under the provisions of the 
Code de Commerce to administer the estate.256 There were considerable debts 
and assets in England, where the court appointed the official receiver as an 
interim receiver. The English Court of Appeal upheld the appointment, express-
ing doubts as to the standing of the syndic before the Court,257 as well as stating 
that the prior foreign bankruptcy was no ground to stay the local proceedings.258 
Fry LJ described three potential approaches to concurrent bankruptcy proceed-
ings.259 First, each forum is to administer the assets locally situated within its 
jurisdiction. 260  Second, every other forum should yield to the forum of the 
domicile, acting only as accessory in aid of the forum of the domicile.261 Third, 
the forum of the country in which the debtor has assets, and in which a court first 
adjudicates him or her bankrupt (whether or not it is the forum of the domicile), 
is entitled to claim foreign assets.262 
Of the three possibilities, Fry LJ rejected the third and, of the other two, ap-
peared to prefer the approach of concurrent territorial administrations, as ‘it may 
be that [its] inconveniences are less than the inconveniences of any other 
course’.263 Commentators have agreed upon this as the correct approach and 
have identified the reluctance of the courts to decline jurisdiction.264 
 
253 Ibid 400–1 (Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). The negative 
declaration sought locally was to prevent the respondent parties from pursuing remedies avail-
able in the United States but not in the local proceedings and were thus stayed as being oppres-
sive. 
254 There may also be concurrent administrations in a probate context: Nygh and Davies, 
above n 75, 677–8. 
255 (1890) 24 QBD 640. 
256 Argument by counsel referred to expert evidence that French law vested the whole administra-
tion of the bankrupt’s property in the syndic. It did not act as an assignment of all the bankrupt’s 
property to the syndic: ibid 641. 
257 See, eg, ibid 644 (Lord Coleridge CJ), 647 (Fry LJ). 
258 See, eg, ibid 646 (Lord Coleridge CJ), 649 (Fry LJ). 
259 Ibid 648–9. 
260 Ibid 648. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid 649. 
263 Ibid 648. 
264 See, eg, Nygh and Davies, above n 75, 639; Sykes and Pryles, above n 4, 784. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.50.05 PM — page 181 of 46
  
2006] Local Proceedings in a Multi-State Liquidation 181 
     
Yet in an Australian case, Radich v Bank of New Zealand,265 a local sequestra-
tion order was set aside where there was a concurrent New Zealand bankruptcy. 
It was argued that there were juridical advantages in instituting a local bank-
ruptcy in order to bring local after-acquired movable property into the estate.266 
Nevertheless, the Federal Court refrained from exercising jurisdiction, even 
though the statutory grounds were satisfied to establish jurisdiction. It found that 
recognition of the foreign order and assistance to the foreign trustee achieved the 
required outcome.267 
Similarly, in corporate insolvency, there are often concurrent proceedings with 
primary and ancillary liquidations. Exclusive jurisdiction is not accorded any 
particular state in respect of winding up companies.268 Section 582(3) of the 
Corporations Act states that a winding-up may occur under Part 5.7 even though 
the foreign company is being wound up elsewhere or has ceased to exist under 
the laws of its place of origin.269 A winding-up order under Corporations Act 
s 601CL requires a winding-up order to have commenced or been completed in 
the registered foreign company’s place of origin. Any winding-up granted by 
way of assistance under Corporations Act s 581 must necessarily follow an 
external administration being instituted in another jurisdiction. 
In Re Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA [No 10],270 a critical issue 
in the distribution of local assets was the significance of the local liquidation 
being ancillary to the liquidation in the place of incorporation. Scott V-C, who 
undertook an extensive review of the authorities, held that: 
Where a foreign company is in liquidation in its country of incorporation, a 
winding up order made in England will normally be regarded as giving rise to a 
winding up ancillary to that being conducted in the country of incorporation.271 
Where a stay based on lis alibi pendens is sought in insolvency proceedings, it 
is not a simple matter to identify whether an identical issue or controversy is 
being litigated in different states. On the one hand, it could be argued that all 
proceedings arising out of the debtor’s insolvency administration are part of the 
 
265 (1993) 45 FCR 101. Until moving to Queensland in 1988, Radich had lived in New Zealand 
where he was declared bankrupt on 4 February 1991. In June 1992, an Australian court granted a 
sequestration order upon the application of the same petitioning creditor and based on the same 
debt and commercial circumstances. Radich opposed the order. An extension of his status as a 
bankrupt would have prejudiced his income and capacity to work as a solicitor. 
266 See ibid 105 (Einfeld J). 
267 Ibid 114 (Einfeld J), 115 (Foster J), 126 (Drummond J). 
268 Cf Air Nauru v Niue Airlines Ltd [1993] 2 NZLR 632. An application to wind up Niue Airlines 
Ltd was brought by the Republic of Nauru, trading as Air Nauru, alleging a failure to pay mon-
eys under an agreement. The contract granted the Supreme Court of Nauru exclusive jurisdiction 
over any legal action or proceedings under the agreement. Master Kennedy-Grant of the High 
Court of New Zealand held the New Zealand court was an appropriate forum noting in passing 
that as it was the only court that could properly be seised of the proceedings to wind up the 
defendant, a New Zealand company. 
269 This provision was first introduced into English company legislation in 1928 to deal with 
Russian banks which had been dissolved in the 1917 revolution, but which still had assets in 
England: see Russian & English Bank v Baring Brothers & Co Ltd [1936] AC 405; Dairen Kisen 
Kabushiki Kaisha v Shiang Kee [1941] AC 373. 
270 [1997] Ch 213. 
271 Ibid 246. 
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same controversy — that is, to do with the bankrupt or liquidated status of the 
debtor.272 Thus, the local court should stay any local proceedings if the foreign 
proceedings would be recognised locally.273  
On the other hand, it could be argued that the particular proceedings do not 
concern the same controversy. Many of the multifaceted issues that arise during 
a local administration concerning assets, creditors, company officers and others 
(and which involve local insolvency and other laws) may not be the subject of 
litigation in the foreign insolvency proceedings. This squarely raises the issue 
discussed in Henry and CSR about what comprises ‘the controversy as a 
whole’.274 
Insolvency adjudications are in a unique category, different to other civil and 
commercial judgments. Such an adjudication initiates a complex procedure that 
arguably has an inherent integrity through the unity of the debtor’s estate being 
realised and distributed. In the administration, the private rights of debtors and 
creditors vis-a-vis each other are transformed into participatory rights in a 
collective process, which also takes into account state interests. The complex 
interaction of a range of laws during an administration and the embedding of 
insolvency law in a state’s commercial, financial and societal culture underpin 
the unique character of insolvency adjudications. A potential unifying factor to 
identify the extent of the controversy is involvement by the principal liquidator 
representing the interests of the debtor’s estate.  
D  Anti-Suit Injunctions 
The High Court in CSR stated that: 
The counterpart of a court’s power to prevent its processes being abused is its 
power to protect the integrity of those processes once set in motion. And in 
some cases, it is that counterpart power of protection that authorises the grant 
of anti-suit injunctions.275 
Anti-suit injunctions are sought to restrain litigants from continuing with 
litigation in another jurisdiction.276 In insolvency proceedings, this has arisen not 
so much in respect of the threshold winding-up petition, but rather where there 
 
272 For example, the majority in Henry (1995) 185 CLR 571, 591 (Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh and 
Gummow JJ), saw that ‘[t]he marital relationship lies at the heart of all proceedings between 
husband and wife with respect to their marital status’. While the marriage was still subsisting, 
the proceedings for judicial separation, divorce and property proceedings all had, as their sub-
ject, the marital relationship, and were part of the same controversy with respect to that relation-
ship. 
273 Ibid. For example, a foreign domiciliary bankruptcy or liquidation order would be recognised 
locally. 
274 CSR (1997) 189 CLR 345, 400–1 (Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and 
Kirby JJ). See also Henry (1995) 185 CLR 571, 592 (Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh and Gum-
mow JJ). 
275 CSR (1997) 189 CLR 345, 391 (Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
276 See generally Trevor U Hartley, ‘Comity and the Use of Antisuit Injunctions in International 
Litigation’ (1987) 35 American Journal of Comparative Law 487; Elizabeth Vuong, ‘Anti-Suit 
Injunctions — A Development of Principles in CSR Limited v Cigna Insurance Australia Limited 
& Ors’ (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review 169. 
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have been related proceedings during the course of the local (or foreign) insol-
vency administration.277  
For example, where an insolvency administration is instituted locally, a court 
may grant an anti-suit injunction to prevent a person from seeking to obtain the 
sole benefit of certain foreign assets through foreign proceedings.278 A creditor 
may seek to prevent a liquidator from issuing proceedings to set aside a voidable 
transaction in another jurisdiction. In Barclays Bank plc v Homan,279 several 
banks sought an injunction in England to prevent the administrators from taking 
recovery action in the US. The English Court of Appeal refused the injunction 
and upheld the primary judge’s decision that where the foreign proceedings were 
not vexatious or oppressive, it was for the foreign court to decide whether or not 
it was the appropriate forum.  
A local liquidator may seek to prevent a creditor from issuing proceedings in a 
foreign court. New Cap Reinsurance Corporation (Bermuda) Ltd v Chase 
Manhattan Bank [No 2]280 concerned an insurance company which was incorpo-
rated in Bermuda and, while not registered in Australia, was carrying on business 
in New South Wales and Victoria. The Supreme Court of Bermuda had appointed 
a provisional liquidator over New Cap Reinsurance (Bermuda) Ltd on the 
application of the Bermudan Registrar of Companies, and the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales had appointed a local provisional liquidator over the com-
pany.281 The Bermudan provisional liquidator sought to restrain creditors from 
pursuing an action in Bermuda which challenged the provisional liquidator’s 
request to the Bermudan court for aid from the Australian court.282 
The court’s power to grant anti-suit injunctions derives both from its inherent 
jurisdiction and its equitable jurisdiction. The inherent power to grant an anti-suit 
injunction is to be exercised when the administration of justice demands it — for 
example where it is necessary to protect the court’s own proceedings and 
processes.283 A court’s equitable jurisdiction includes the power to make orders 
to restrain unconscionable conduct or the unconscientious exercise of legal rights 
— for example, because they are vexatious or oppressive.284 In the latter case, 
the local court must first apply the Voth test to decide if it is not a ‘clearly 
inappropriate forum’ to determine the matter in issue before considering whether 
to grant an anti-suit injunction or to require the applicant to seek a stay of the 
 
277 In Chapman v Travelstead (1998) 86 FCR 460, the Federal Court refused to set aside an order to 
serve outside the jurisdiction and to stay local contractual proceedings where the defendant had 
entered into foreign bankruptcy proceedings. 
278 See Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee [1987] AC 871, 892 (Lord Goff). 
279 [1993] BCLC 680. 
280 [1999] NSWSC 808 (Unreported, Austin J, 4 August 1999). 
281 Re New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Holdings Ltd (1999) 32 ACSR 234. 
282 See also New Cap Reinsurance Corporation (Bermuda) Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [No 2] 
[1999] NSWSC 808 (Unreported, Austin J, 4 August 1999) [22]. 
283 In such a case, no question arises as to whether the court is an appropriate forum for the 
resolution of that issue because it is the only court with any interest in the matter: CSR (1997) 
189 CLR 345, 398 (Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
284 Ibid 392 (Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). That is, the conduct 
must be vexatious or oppressive according to the local dictates of equity and good conscience, 
rather than in the sense that they are an abuse of the foreign court’s processes or even in the 
sense that they should be stayed by the foreign court on forum non conveniens grounds. 
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foreign proceedings.285 The courts exercise the power to grant anti-suit injunc-
tions with caution for reasons of comity. This applies whether the injunction is 
sought in the exercise of the inherent or equitable jurisdiction.286 
It is uncertain whether a foreign liquidation order will operate as a local stay 
on dealings with the debtor’s assets, either by the debtor itself or by the debtor’s 
creditors. In fact, in Mercantile Credits Ltd v Foster Clark (Australia) Ltd, the 
High Court commented that: ‘One of the strongest reasons there can be for 
making a winding-up order is that thereby one of a number of creditors will be 
stopped in an attempt to get more than his proper share out of assets that are 
insufficient to satisfy all.’287 
Injunctive relief in the context of insolvency was recently sought in Re Inde-
pendent Insurance Co Ltd,288 in which a letter of request was directed by the 
High Court of Justice of England and Wales to the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales under Corporations Act s 581.289 The plaintiff company and its provi-
sional liquidators applied ex parte for a declaration recognising a petition to wind 
up the company presented to the foreign court in June 2001, as well as recognis-
ing the appointment of the provisional liquidators. In addition, they sought 
orders that, unless leave was granted by the foreign court and subject to such 
terms as it may impose, 
the continuation or commencement of any action or proceeding against the 
Company or its property in Australia shall be restrained while the joint provi-
sional liquidators are appointed to the Company or after a winding up order has 
been made in relation to the Company.290 
Barrett J noted that the Court was being asked 
to award remedies that are general equitable remedies. This is in line with cases 
in which the equitable remedy of appointment of a receiver has been granted by 
a court exercising auxiliary jurisdiction in support of a foreign insolvent ad-
ministration: see, eg Re A Debtor (Order in Aid No 1 of 1979) [1981] Ch 384; 
Dick as Trustee in Bankruptcy v McIntosh [2001] FCA 1008. … Such provi-
sions [ss 581(2)(a) and 581(3)] do not augment the jurisdiction except in a geo-
graphic sense.291 
The claim for injunctive relief was being advanced apart from any lis inter 
partes and sought ‘an order expressed to be binding on the whole world in the 
manner of legislation’.292 Barrett J noted that Australia had not yet enacted laws 
adopting recognised international measures for the administration of 
cross-border insolvencies, although it referred to well-advanced moves to 
 
285 Ibid 397–8 (Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
286 Ibid 396 (Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
287 (1964) 112 CLR 169, 175 (Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ). 
288 (2005) 193 FLR 43. 
289 For more detailed discussion on this provision, see below Part V(F). 
290 Re Independent Insurance Co Ltd (2005) 193 FLR 43, 46 (Barrett J). 
291 Ibid 50. 
292 Ibid 51 (Barrett J), citing his own judgment in Re AFG Insurances Ltd (2002) 20 ACLC 1588, 
1593. 
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incorporate the UNCITRAL Model Law293 into Australian law. In that context, 
Barrett J concluded: 
In the meantime, in a case such as the present involving a corporate insolvency 
in the United Kingdom, the only special jurisdiction this court has is that con-
ferred by s 581 of the Corporations Act. And, insofar as that section empowers 
the court to deploy its general equitable jurisdiction in aid of a United Kingdom 
court in a way that territorial limitations would otherwise not allow, the juris-
diction is to be exercised in accordance with principles of general applica-
tion.294 
Although the order as requested in general terms was not made, Barrett J 
emphasised that, by virtue of s 581, the Court had jurisdiction to restrain the 
initiation or continuation of any specific proceedings against the company or 
affecting its property, as well as jurisdiction to stay certain proceedings.295 
E  Discretion in the Exercise of Jurisdiction  
Even when exercising its jurisdiction to make a liquidation order, an Australian 
court may determine not to make the order. The Corporations Act states that the 
court ‘may’ make the sequestration or liquidation order upon proof of the 
statutory requirements. 296  Section 467 of the Corporations Act is worded 
permissively so that a court is not required to make an order merely upon proof 
of a ground for winding-up.297 This discretion to refuse an order is not necessar-
ily exercised merely because the company has no property.298 Alternatively, the 
court may, having made a liquidation order, order a stay of those proceedings.299  
In Re New England Brewing Co Ltd300 a petition was presented to wind up a 
New South Wales company which was registered as a foreign company in 
Queensland. Subsequently, a winding-up order was made in the place of its 
incorporation. The evidence disclosed that there were local creditors in Queen-
sland and matters requiring investigation during a winding-up.301 Apart from 
this, the Supreme Court of Queensland saw no reason to incur the extra expense 
of a Queensland liquidation. It would only be an ancillary administration and 
there was no reason to suppose that the New South Wales liquidator would not 
adequately carry out his duties under the Companies Act 1961 (NSW). 302 
Accordingly, Lucas J decided to exercise his discretion against making a 
winding-up order at that stage.303 The petition was adjourned to a date to be 
 
293 See above n 27. 
294 Re Independent Insurance Co Ltd (2005) 193 FLR 43, 61 (Barrett J). 
295 Ibid. 
296 Corporations Act ss 459A, 459B, 467. 
297 Keay, above n 44, 92. See at 103–4 on abuse of process as a ground for dismissal. 
298 Corporations Act s 467(2)(b). 
299 Corporations Act s 482. 
300 [1970] QWN 49. 
301 There were alleged breaches of company law in relation to the allotment of shares and the issue 
of a prospectus. 
302 Re New England Brewing Co Ltd [1970] QWN 49, 124 (Lucas J). 
303 Ibid 125. 
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fixed in case circumstances were disclosed during the liquidation which would 
appear to justify a local ancillary liquidation.304 
F  Jurisdiction under the ‘Aid and Auxiliary’ Provisions  
As already foreshadowed, courts may exercise jurisdiction in a multi-state 
corporate insolvency through the mutual aid and assistance provisions of the 
Corporations Act.305 Section 581(2) of the Corporations Act states:  
In all external administration matters, the Court: 
 (a) must act in aid of, and be auxiliary to, the courts of: 
 (i) external Territories; and 
 (ii) States that are not in this jurisdiction;306 and 
 (iii) prescribed countries; 
  that have jurisdiction in external administration matters; and 
 (b) may act in aid of, and be auxiliary to, the courts of other countries that 
have jurisdiction in external administration matters. 
A distinction is drawn between the degrees of cooperation afforded to courts in 
‘prescribed countries’ and those in other countries. The former are listed in 
Corporations Regulation 2001 (Cth) reg 5.6.74 as: Jersey; Canada; Papua New 
Guinea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Switzerland; the United Kingdom; 
and the United States of America. 
Under s 580, ‘external administration matter’ means a matter relating to: 
 (a) winding up, under this Chapter, a company or a Part 5.7 body; or 
 (b) winding up, outside Australia, a body corporate or a Part 5.7 body; or 
 (c) the insolvency of a body corporate or of a Part 5.7 body. 
The Federal Court in Joye v Beach Petroleum NL held: 
any step taken by a liquidator in getting in the assets of the corporation is a step 
taken in the winding up; and this is so whether or not the step taken involves 
litigation aimed at recovery of the assets. If litigation is necessary, the conduct 
of that litigation is, in our view, a ‘matter’ that ‘relates to’ the ‘winding up’.307 
 
304 Ibid. 
305 In Smith as Liquidator of TC Coombs & Co (in liq) v Australian Securities Commission (1995) 
16 ACSR 424, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales received assistance from the 
Supreme Court of Victoria to recover Australian assets which were beneficially owned by a 
company in liquidation in England. The assets were shares formerly held by a subsidiary of the 
English company, which had been deregistered in Australia and whose shares vested in the 
Australian Securities Commission. The Supreme Court ordered that the Australian Securities 
Commission transfer the shares listed in the High Court order to the English liquidator. How-
ever, in respect of excess shares not listed in the request, the Supreme Court of Victoria indicated 
it would need to reinstate the Australian company prior to any order to transfer such property to 
the English liquidator: at 428–9 (Hayne J). 
306 This provision is required in the event that some states do not continue to refer their corporations 
power to the Commonwealth. 
307 (1996) 67 FCR 275, 287–8 (Beaumont and Lehane JJ). Their Honours approved the definition of 
‘winding-up’ by McPherson SPJ in Re Crust ‘n’ Crumb Bakers (Wholesale) Pty Ltd [1992] 2 
Qd R 76, 78: ‘Winding up is a process that consists of collecting assets, realising and reducing 
them to money, dealing with proofs of creditors by admitting or rejecting them, and distributing 
the net proceeds, after providing for the costs and expenses, to the persons entitled’: 
 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.50.05 PM — page 187 of 46
  
2006] Local Proceedings in a Multi-State Liquidation 187 
     
The notion of ‘external administration matter’ was further explored in Re AFG 
Insurances Ltd,308 where the Supreme Court of New South Wales declined to 
issue a letter of request to a foreign court seeking aid and assistance in respect of 
a voluntary administration. The applicants sought recognition of the status and 
authority of the voluntary administrators and their agents to act on behalf of the 
company and an order that proceedings not be commenced or continued against 
the company in England, except by leave of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales or the administrators. The judgment referred to the effect of the s 580 
definition of ‘external administration matter’, 309  especially para (c) (‘the 
insolvency of a body corporate or of a Part 5.7 body’), and s 581(4) (courts that 
have jurisdiction in an ‘external administration matter’310). Barrett J held: 
A Pt 5.3A administration is not a regime imposed by or arising from an order of 
this court or any other court. No court has the general superintendence or 
control of such an administration. … No particular court covers the field, 
although in a practical sense one may come to do so just because all 
applications happen to be made to it. 
This makes me think that, in the administration context (much more, perhaps, 
than in the case of a winding up ordered by the court), a foreign court can be 
regarded as acting in aid of or as auxiliary to this court only where this court 
has become seised of a particular proceeding relevant to the administration and 
the full and effective exercise of this court’s jurisdiction will be assisted by 
some ancillary order of a foreign court.311 
In the subsequent case of Re AFG Insurances Ltd (admin apptd),312 the Su-
preme Court of New South Wales made declarations that the company had 
become subject to voluntary administration on a certain date and that the two 
administrators had been appointed on the same day. In such circumstances,313 the 
Court was prepared to request the English court make such orders, as it would be 
open to the Court to make those orders within the latter’s jurisdiction.314  
Arguably, a court may make a winding-up order under s 581 as a result of a 
request from a foreign court for assistance. In New Cap Reinsurance Corpora-
tion (Bermuda) Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [No 2],315 the provisional liquida-
tor of a Bermudan company successfully sought the appointment of an Austra-
 
Joye v Beach Petroleum NL (1996) 67 FCR 275, 287. In Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) [2004] 
NSWSC 454 (Unreported, Barrett J, 21 March 2004), the court held that a s 596B examination 
in a winding-up fell within para (a) of ‘external administration’. 
308 (2002) 20 ACLC 1588. 
309 Ibid 1590 (Barrett J). 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid 1592. 
312 (2002) 43 ACSR 60. 
313 The Court was also satisfied with the additional evidence produced to establish the company’s 
insolvency: ibid 61 (Barrett J). 
314 An order requesting the assistance of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in a voluntary 
administration was granted in Re Federation Group Ltd (2005) 223 ALR 68, in which declara-
tions on commencement of the voluntary administration and the appointment of the administra-
tors were also made. 
315 [1999] NSWSC 808 (Unreported, Austin J, 4 August 1999). 
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lian provisional liquidator to the company which was not registered as a foreign 
company but had been carrying on business in Australia. It did so in order that: 
an Australian provisional liquidator could locate and get in Australian assets 
and corporate records, make investigations and take other steps to protect the 
company’s Australian assets, and deal with the company’s bankers (The Chase 
Manhattan Bank in Sydney) whom [the provisional liquidator] had attempted to 
contact without success.316 
VI  CONCLUSION 
This article has addressed various issues concerning jurisdiction and local 
proceedings in a multi-state corporate insolvency. It has sought to place the 
issues within the context of both multi-state insolvency theories, as well as 
private international law principles on jurisdiction. In so doing, it has aimed to 
provide wide-ranging discussion of the issues that may face a local court in 
exercising jurisdiction in a multi-state corporate insolvency.  
This article returns to basics to outline Australian courts’ geographical jurisdic-
tion, as well as their jurisdiction to prescribe conduct and jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate between parties, in an insolvency context. In the process, it highlights a 
range of issues peculiar to insolvency for courts called upon to determine 
questions of jurisdiction in local proceedings in a multi-state liquidation.  
The Australian Constitution specifically allocates power in respect of ‘bank-
ruptcy and insolvency’ to the Commonwealth317 to be exercised concurrently 
with the states. However, the legislative history is such that bankruptcy and 
insolvency for individuals are dealt with by a comprehensive statute,318 whereas 
insolvency for companies is addressed as part of the comprehensive corpora-
tions’ legislation with its attendant constitutional limitations. 
In addition, this history has affected the allocation of jurisdiction to prescribe 
conduct in respect of bankruptcy and insolvency. Statute allocates ‘exclusive 
jurisdiction’ in bankruptcy to federal courts, whereas corporate insolvency 
jurisdiction is vested concurrently in federal, state and territory courts. Thus 
potential jurisdictional issues for state and territory courts as to what constitutes 
bankruptcy proceedings are avoided for liquidation proceedings. However, 
analogous issues may arise during the course of the liquidation, whether they are 
incidental or intrinsic to the insolvency.319 
The jurisdiction to adjudicate in a multi-state liquidation is addressed primarily 
by Corporations Act s 583, although ss 601CL(14) and 581 are also potentially 
relevant. The major issue regarding the existence of a local jurisdiction to 
 
316 Ibid [3]. This case concerned a dispute over a substantial assets held in an Australian bank 
account. 
317 Australian Constitution s 51(xvii). 
318 See Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) pt IV div 6 (compositions or arrangements with creditors); pt VI 
(administration of property for insolvent debtors); pt IX (debt agreements by insolvent debtors); 
pt X (personal insolvency agreements by insolvent debtors). 
319 See above nn 141–8 and accompanying text, in particular the discussion on the implications of 
the bankruptcy and winding-up exemption in the Brussels Convention, opened for signature 27 
September 1968, 8 ILM 229 (entered into force 1 February 1973). 
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adjudicate under s 583 derives from the definition of a ‘Part 5.7 body’, to which 
that section applies. This raises questions as to a foreign company’s local 
registration or whether it carries (or has carried) on business in Australia. 
The exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate in a multi-state liquidation raises a 
number of issues. First, the local court may decline to exercise the jurisdiction, 
determining itself to be a clearly inappropriate forum for the determination of the 
dispute. Second, where local jurisdiction has been exercised, a court may, in the 
context of concurrent proceedings, nevertheless order a stay on local proceedings 
under the doctrine of lis alibi pendens. In an insolvency however, it may be 
difficult to identify whether the local proceedings comprise the identical 
controversy being litigated in the foreign state. Alternatively, the local court may 
grant an anti-suit injunction to restrain litigants from continuing the foreign 
concurrent proceedings. These last two issues are more likely to arise in respect 
of proceedings during the course of a liquidation rather than on the threshold 
issue of winding up the company, given the courts’ willingness to adjudicate in 
favour of concurrent liquidations, albeit nominating one as principal and the 
other(s) as ancillary.320 
Next in exercising its jurisdiction to wind up a company, the court may decline 
to make the order, as the provisions concerning a Part 5.7 body321 are permissive 
rather than obligatory.322 This contrasts with the mandatory provision in respect 
of a locally registered foreign company being wound up in its place of incorpora-
tion.323  
Finally, local jurisdiction to adjudicate in a multi-state liquidation includes 
auxiliary jurisdiction to provide aid and assistance upon request from a foreign 
court. 
It is timely to raise these jurisdictional issues surrounding local proceedings in 
a multi-state liquidation. In October 2005, the federal government announced it 
would be proceeding with an integrated package of reforms to improve the 
operation of Australia’s corporate insolvency laws. 324  One aspect of these 
reforms will be the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law.325 The reforms will 
provide mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency and will 
adopt the approach detailed in the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
Proposals for Reform, Paper No 8 (2002) (‘CLERP 8’).326 
 
320 Re Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA [No 10] [1997] Ch 213. 
321 Corporations Act s 583. 
322 Corporations Act ss 459A, 459B, 461. See also Corporations Act s 467. 
323 Corporations Act s 601CL(14). 
324 Australian Government Treasury, Corporate Insolvency Reform (2005) <http://www.treasury. 
gov.au/documents/1022/PDF/Corporate_Insolvancy_Reform_attachment.pdf>. 
325 For a more detailed discussion on the UNCITRAL Model Law, see Rosalind Mason, 
‘Cross-Border Insolvency: Adoption of CLERP 8 as an Evolution of Australian Insolvency Law’ 
(2003) 11 Insolvency Law Journal 62. 
326 The Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services recommended that Australia adopt 
the UNCITRAL Model Law as proposed by CLERP 8: Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services, Parliament of Australia, Corporate Insolvency Laws: A Stocktake (2004) 
xxxvi <http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-
04/ail/report/ail.pdf>. See also Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Improv-
ing Australia’s Corporate Insolvency Laws: Issues Paper (2003). 
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Significantly, the UNCITRAL Model Law does not allocate jurisdiction to wind 
up a company, unlike the Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings.327 Instead it provides for judicial cooperation between states as 
well as rights of access for foreign insolvency administrators and recognition of 
foreign insolvency proceedings by participating states. Nevertheless, it does 
provide for an automatic stay on local proceedings flowing from recognition of a 
‘foreign main proceeding’.328 As such, it may affect the courts’ approach to 
issues raised above, such as the doctrine of lis alibi pendens and the granting of 
anti-suit injunctions. 
CLERP 8 proposes enacting the UNCITRAL Model Law as a separate enact-
ment of the Commonwealth Parliament.329 Further, it does not recommend the 
repeal of current Corporations Act provisions relevant to multi-state liquidations. 
It proposes to retain s 601CL(14)–(16) to address circumstances that fall outside 
the scope of the UNCITRAL Model Law or where the UNCITRAL Model Law is 
not invoked.330 Part 5.7 is to be retained, but with such changes as are necessary 
to ensure it operates harmoniously with the UNCITRAL Model Law and consis-
tently with the remainder of Chapter 5 of the Corporations Act.331 Sections 580–
1 dealing with cooperation between courts are also to be retained in relation to 
external administration matters arising under the Corporations Act.332 
As this article indicates, a substantial jurisprudence surrounds the local exer-
cise of jurisdiction in multi-state corporate insolvencies. This is unlikely to be 
swept away by the adoption of this multilaterally developed approach to im-
proved international cooperation. In particular, the Commonwealth proposals to 
retain these provisions of the Corporations Act on multi-state liquidations will 
ensure the relevance of this jurisprudence. This elaboration on a range of issues 
in the context of multi-state insolvency theories and private international law 
scholarship on jurisdiction provides a framework for considering the complex 
issues that are likely to arise in multi-state liquidations independently of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and its proposed adoption. 
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328 UNCITRAL Model Law art 20. A ‘foreign main proceeding’ is defined as ‘a foreign proceeding 
taking place in the State where the debtor has the centre of its main interests’: UNCITRAL Model 
Law art 2(a). ‘In the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor’s registered office … is pre-
sumed to be the centre of [a corporate] debtor’s main interests.’: UNCITRAL Model Law 
art 16(3). 
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